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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy & Finance at the 
International Hellenic University. Tweets of President Donald Trump are related to his 
mood and sentiment on time, affecting market expectations, just like the one 
announcing to the public the effective ban of Huawei from selling in the United States 
market and acquiring technology from American corporations. The purpose of this 
study is to investigate the impact of baring Huawei from the American market in the 
American technology sector, with a specific focus on the 21 suppliers of the Chinese 
tech giant, utilizing event study methodology and daily data to test for significant effect 
from the actions taken against Huawei on 15 of May 2019. Results support the 
hypothesis of a clear exogenous event with the market fully unaware of the intuitions 
before it, followed with negative abnormal returns in the short term and linear 
relationship between exposed individual firm revenues and price return. Aggregating 
the abnormal returns and examining the cumulative abnormal return, results indicate a 
strong negative market reaction for several days. Whereas the day ceasing the effective 
ban, the most exposed suppliers in real monetary values, suffered from significantly 
negative abnormal returns. Lastly, an abnormal volatility study proves an explosion in 
risk the day following the event. This is important to investors and market participants 
since an unexpected political and economic event may have severe effects, while one 
may put the episode in the series of Sino-American trade war actions. 
 
Aleksandros Nanaj 
December 2019 
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1. Introduction 
Huawei is a powerhouse telecommunications company, expertise in the field of 
network deployment technology and second-largest Smartphone retailer, ahead of 
Apple. The current trade policy of the United States of America (USA) appears to 
support a strategy of domestic market protectionism, aiming for the reduction of imports 
and bringing manufacturing to the USA. While the way that President Donald Trump 
influences the markets is unprecedented, via a simple tweet he is able to raise a 
worldwide interest, expressing his will in accordance with new policies or even 
introducing new Act to the public. Such as in the case of Huawei, were via a mere tweet 
on May 15 of 2019, he announced the effective ban of the corporation with the sign of a 
national security order and the enlistment on the government's “entities list”. In simple 
words, a tweet informed the world that Huawei Telecommunication Company had no 
more access to the USA market neither as a seller nor as a buyer. 
This study is set to examine the effect of barring Huawei from the American 
supply chain and how this announcement affected the company’s supplier’s value in the 
frame of event studies. 
A standard procedure in finance and economics is the study of how stock prices 
react to event announcements. Event Study Methodology is generally referred tool to 
quantify the impact of a specific political or economic event throughout estimating the 
unexpected, abnormal returns and testing their significance. Based on the classical study 
of Efficient Market Hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), and given the rationality in 
the financial market, security prices “fully reflect” the available information at any time. 
Thereby, any new information will be reflected in the share prices immediately and 
almost completely, without biasness. Thus the event's short-term economic impact can 
be studied using shares value observed on the financial market. 
In practice event studies have been used to i) test the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Malkiel and Fama, 1970), ii) measure the impact of an event over the firms' wealth. 
Late years policy changes call and challenge economists to estimate the effect of a new 
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set of regulations. At which degree new regulations will affect a firm or a sector should 
be fully reflected on its security price. 
Steps of conducting an event study were outlined by MacKinlay (1997): 
a) Identify the event of interest. E.g. New tax policy. 
b) Event window definition. The time period over which the stock price is 
experiencing the event. 
c) Analysis sample set selection. 
d) Estimation of normal returns. 
e) Estimation of abnormal returns during the event window. Abnormal return is 
defined as the difference between the expected, normal return and the actual, 
observed during the event window. 
f) Test abnormal returns whether are statistically significant i.e. If stock price reacted 
beyond the expected, normal changes. 
Studies of regulatory changes face a series of challenges. Analysts must carefully 
interpret hypothesis tests and design them according to the nature of the changes they 
want to examine. Also, they exhibit an increased difficulty in identifying the event 
window, characteristic is the example of the deregulation of cable television. Prager 
(1992) had 18 event periods over an event window from January 1981 till August 1985. 
This peculiarity derives from the procedure of passing an Act. Usually takes several 
months from the first announcement of the new Act till the final sanction. In the 
meantime there are numerous events-announcements and leaks that may affect the firm 
value, this study addresses this issue to a great extent. 
The research has the following structure: Section 2 is devoted to literature review of 
event studies and studies measuring the effects of the so-called “Trumpism”. Section 3 
summarizes the timeframe before and up to the event, providing crucial literature for a 
deeper understanding of the event. Section 4 explains the detailed sample data set 
selection and the research design. Section 5 presents the basic results, a range of 
robustness tests and analyzes the effects. Last section 6 concludes and discusses the 
results. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter focuses on the literature review regarding the determinants of 
conducting an event study. It is divided into two subsections: The first section is 
focused on the more general literature framework on how to conduct event studies, 
whereas the second section is focused on the literature that isolates event studies 
measuring the effect of news release and regulatory changes.  
2.1. Literature Review of Event Studies 
Literature on how a firm is affected by news is vast. Over the past decades the so-
called event study has become a broad methodology of analysis, what was first 
introduced as a statistical tool for empirical research in accounting and finance, 
considering as landmark papers the Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969), is 
now broadly used in economics, history, law, management, marketing, and political 
science. The case of using event studies on evaluating regulatory changes is established 
by Schwert (1981), undoubtedly useful for the episodes of state deregulation or stricter 
regulation analysis depending on the industry and event of interest. The major step in 
using financial data as a measure to the effects of a regulation or news announcement, 
which provides more powerful results in comparison to accounting data, since they are 
related to the expected cash flow of the firm and the future earnings (Antoniou and 
Pescetto, 1997). 
Through the years have been a lot of advances in the methodology and the 
interpretation of an event study, but the key focus of measuring the normal, mean, 
returns and abnormal, cumulative returns, before and during the event time of the 
sample of interest holds since the very first studies. Early methodology studies in capital 
markets were using monthly returns data to perform statistical tests (Brown and Warner, 
1980; (Larcker, Gordon and Pinches, 1980); (Shevlin, 1981), but soon outperformed by 
studies using daily data returns. Brown and Warner (1985) work is the backbone of 
event studies using daily data. Both Brown and Warner studies examine the 
performance of the average return, index and market models for generating the expected 
returns for every model, using an amount of adjustments and significance tests. Using 
the procedure of simulation for generating random events and with real daily data they 
-4- 
examine the effectiveness of various event study methodologies. The result of the work 
was a clear revolution in event studies, indicating that using daily data returns are 
performing in practice at least as good as monthly data returns. Dyckman, Philbrick and 
Stephan (1984) similarly to Brown and Warner (1985) examine the use of daily data 
returns, with the market returns, market-adjusted returns and mean adjusted returns 
models. They come up with some severe problems on using daily data such as i) the 
biasness of the estimations, ii) the nonsynchronous trading and most importantly iii) the 
non-normality on the returns. Brown and Warner specifically conclude that the concern 
of non-normality that daily data returns exhibit does not impact the event study 
methodologies. Of course, there are studies questioning these results, Chandra, 
Moriarity and Willinger (1990) analytically examine and show that the outperformance 
of the mean-adjusted is a statistic artifact, concluding that market and market-adjusted 
models for abnormal return tests produce more powerful results. 
Brown and Warner (1980) type studies conclude that standard parametric tests, 
which rely on the assumption of normal distribution among returns, have a good power 
test while are good enough specified. The concerns of non-normally distributed returns, 
which can lead to inconsistent results under the assumption of standard parametric tests, 
led to the use of nonparametric and rank tests. Bartholdy, Olson and Peare (2007) work 
yield that sign and rank tests are more powerful than parametric tests. In this study are 
used stock returns derived from the stock exchange market of Copenhagen. In a review 
study of examining the statistic performance among event study tests, Corrado and 
Truong (2008) using data from Asia-Pacific stock markets, show that sign and 
nonparametric tests are consistent, while parametric tests are poorly performing. 
However nonparametric tests exhibit failures when it comes to examine cumulative 
abnormal returns for multiple days tests. On a single day event study analysis, 
nonparametric tests (Cowan, 1992); (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010); (Corrado, 1989) and 
(Corrado and Zivney, 1992) are dominant. Trying to overcome the shortcoming of 
multiple days study Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) introduced the generalized rank test 
(GRANK). This method is used for both cumulative and single day cumulative 
abnormal returns. According to Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) paper this method exhibit 
five key advantages, i) robustness on induced volatility, ii) proved empirical dominance 
over standard parametric and previous rank tests, iii) robustness to autocorrelation, iv) 
robustness for a degree of cross-correlation caused by the clustering, and v) free 
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distributional, thereby less sensitive to assumptions. Thereby GRANK test is a 
procedure available for generic use of event studies. 
The study review conducted by Kothari and Warner (2007) found 500 studies 
published in the top five journals of finance and accounting for the period from 1974 to 
2005. It is easily understandable that the literature over this type of study is vast, while 
yet a holistic review study is not implemented; it would be both very long and 
multidimensional given the different properties that different event study types exhibit. 
Kothari and Warner (2007) indicate that studies are far from homogenous and differ on 
time, both estimating normal returns and event window abnormal returns estimation 
periods and sample characteristics. In addition mention the limitations that long-term 
studies suffer from. 
Overall results from previous studies indicate that the methodology of event study 
is a powerful tool on detecting the effect of a specific event on security prices.  
2.2. The Effect of News and Regulatory Changes 
This section is devoted to regulatory and news related event studies and 
researches based on the Donald Trump effect on financial markets.  
This is not the first time during Trump in the term that a change in regulatory 
affects financial markets. His presidential election alone came as a surprise to the 
majority of market participants. Several studies account for his effect on the financial 
markets. Hachenberg et al. (2017) conducted an event study using bank stock prices and 
credit default swaps (CDS) spreads examining the effect of the Donald Trump election 
and the reaction of the banking sector. This study shows that the announcement of 
Trump's victory followed by an overall increase to the stock prices, while the CDS 
spreads widened. Mainly due to the anticipation of weakening the financial institutions, 
allowing increased financial activity into riskier businesses, while two days after his 
election announced on his webpage the reform of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (2010). Pham et al. (2018) investigate the effects of 
multiple events prior and until the 2016 Donald Trump presidential election specifically 
linked to his nomination. The event window starts with the Donald Trump 
announcement running for the Republican Party ticket, on 18/03/2015 up to 15 days 
after his election as the 45th USA president. For events are considered not only the 
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elections and announcements but also statements and debates, coming up with a total 
sum of 47 events. For data are included stock prices from each sector, as grouped on 
Bloomberg, stock market indexes and the U.S. 3-month Treasury Bill as a risk-free 
proxy. The study comes up with the evidence that the USA stock market was highly 
responsive to the events linked to his nomination and election, but also deal with the 
concept of “diamond risk”, thereby the changes in the systematic risk during the 
election. With particular reference to the electronic and electrical equipment sector 
reacted positively, mainly due to statements of expansion in military expenditures and 
the implementation of tariffs on imports from China.  
When it comes to political uncertainty the USA Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index dominated that of China in influencing global markets, while the USA stock 
market, based on the Dow Jones index, plays a major role in global market movements 
(Zhang et al., 2019).  
Moreover, studies show that share prices drift for several months after important 
public news (Kothari and Warner, 1997); (Fama, 1998) and (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998). Chan (2003) research shows that stocks related to news exhibit 
a drift, with bad news momentum persistent up to 12 months after the news release, 
while good news is found less. This is interpreted as a slow price reflection to bad 
public news. Moreover Chan (2003) found that stocks with no news on the subsequent 
month tent to reverse, this evidence is pursuant to the theory of investors' overreaction 
in the sight of spurious price movement. Neuhierl, Scherbina and Schlusche (2013) 
conducted event studies on a comprehensive sample data set across different corporate 
news categories, finding that news about legal developments, the management team, 
products corporate strategy and financial related are high value relevant. In addition 
found that share prices strongly react to non-financial news release as well. In 
particular, they found that news about customer losses; FDA rejections, management 
terminations, and defects have a negative effect, whereas news about awards, new 
partnerships new management, successful research, new products, and legal settlements 
are followed by positive market reaction. 
Accusations that Huawei is closely linked with the Chinese Communist Party 
makes it more vulnerable to the trade war between the USA and China. But also hides a 
powerful tool, the asymmetric information, meaning that the managers of the company 
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are well informed of the negotiation line and the results prior to the market. According 
to Yusoff et al. (2015) politically linked firms imply a weak form of Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970) and low predictability for abnormal returns 
related to surprising political news. From Hong Kong property blacklisting Yau (2009) 
come up with the result of no effect on prices, in contrast to the expectation of a 
negative impact on the property affected sale prices. Thereby the market was well 
informed and had evaluated the properties prior to the public announcement in 
November 2000 of the list, which did not imply any further information to change the 
prices. Since Huawei is not listed on any market, classified as a collective entity with 
the only “shareholders” its employers, founded by an ex-military engineer is set on “the 
first line of fires” on the trade war between the USA and China. The investigation 
wither Huawei is subsided or funded by the Chinese government exceeds the purpose of 
this study, but these main points are worthy to be mentioned for the elaboration of the 
event series leading to the main event, the blacklist of the company on the following 
chapter. 
Event studies on regulatory changes according to Lamdin (2001) carry an 
inherited problem, the difficulty of specifying the event periods, especially when news 
are gradually released over a period, occurring to revaluation effect or even to fully 
“priced out”. In addition to the market noise window, uncertainty leads to less powerful 
results or even fault one. On the other hand events such as dividend or merger 
announcements are easily identified and assumed to have a specified window period 
over which any effect is sited on stock prices. One way to tackle event window issue is 
through a modified market model with Dummy variable(s). 
A review study on methods of evaluating the regulatory effects is conducted by 
Joskow and Rose (1989), while Binder (1985) discusses ways of conducting regulatory 
effect studies using stock market data. 
3. The event 
This session is devoted to elaborating on the series of events that led to the main 
event of interest, the blacklist of Huawei, and why the event date is well specified. 
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Huawei has a long, ongoing dispute with the USA government, dated back to 
2008 when it was banned from acquiring part of Motorola market cap and 3Com 
company. In 2010 was banned from bidding on telecommunication contracts due to 
concerns over national security. In 2012, during the Obama term, along with ZTE were 
called a “security threat” and untrustworthy by the US Intelligence Committee. It was a 
yearlong investigation that caused their exclusion from the US National Emergency 
Communications Network project. Till today Huawei has suffered a series of banns and 
exclusions from bidding on various projects and contracts, especially the deployment of 
5G Networks, from various countries, Australia, New Zealand, G. Britain and Japan are 
the major cases (Voon and Mitchell, 2019). Huawei has valued the importance of 
entering and performing well in the US market, as well as taken into consideration the 
difficulty of this objective given the timing, over the edge of a trade war between China 
and the USA, and the term in the office of pro-protectionists authorities. Trump came to 
power with the slogans “Make America Great Again” and “America first” and since the 
very beginning of his administration is attempting to reverse the trade deficit of the 
USA. China has the largest trade surplus with the USA, thus heralding trade war to 
China and Chinese corporations was not unexpected. The aim of this attempt is to bring 
surplus countries such as China and Germany on the negotiation table and reduction 
protectionist measures against the USA. Here should be mentioned that according to 
international macroeconomics and open-economics, is implied that tariffs cannot be 
used as a remedy when trade imbalances are caused by macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The aim of this study is to examine the potential effect over American corporations, 
thereby a backfire from the protectionism attempts. 
The case of “security threat” was a lost cause for Huawei, but what followed 
was a tornado for the markets. December 2018, the Chief Financial Officer of Huawei 
and daughter of Huawei founder, was arrested in Canada after the request of the USA 
authorities. At that moment the G20 meeting was underway, where China and the USA 
agreed to postpone the trade war between the two countries. As already mentioned the 
aim of this study is not to examine wither the USA is deploying an anti-competitive 
behavior or violating non-discrimination obligations over Huawei or China (Mascitelli 
and Chung, 2019) and (Voon and Mitchell, 2019), but these are major facts, worthy to 
be mentioned for the spherical understanding of the event. 
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The first signs came in light in late 2018, when a report suggested the use of an 
executive order to ban Huawei purchases. “The White House may issue an executive 
order early next year that limits purchases in the US from two of China's largest 
telecommunications equipment makers… The order could be signed as early as 
January, according to Reuters.” (Zhou, 2018). 
On May 15 of 2019, a tweet from President Trump announced the effective ban 
over Huawei with a national security order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (Exec. Order No. 13,648, 
2019). The second move, also on May 15, was the announcement of the Commerce 
Department that it adds Huawei to the government’s “entities list”, barring USA 
businesses from trading with it, Addition of Entities to the Entity List (Bureau of 
Industry and Security 2019).  
In simple words, on 15 May 2019, Huawei was not only banned from selling its 
products to the USA market but also banned from acquiring technology, services and 
components from USA firms without the USA governmental permission. In this case, 
USA supplier companies stand to lose out, Huawei spent only on 2018 approximately 
$11 billion in American companies. A major example is NeoPhotonics, whose 47% of 
revenues come from Huawei. Analysts called the company jeopardized. 
Thereby, despite that regulatory event studies have the inherited problem of 
defining the actual event date, in this case the tweet of President Trump caught markets 
fully unconscious, while the sign of the Executive Order was immediate, thus “first” 
and “final” announcement of the order being on the same date, 15 of May 2019. 
Economic Theory strongly suggests that protectionist policies and measures, in 
whatever way are imposed, are a risky-taking move, especially among trade partners, 
and are impossible to survive in the long run. On May 20 the USA Commerce 
Department step back on the restrictions on doing business with Huawei, revealing a 
general license for access to American equipment until the 19th of August. Thereby 
under the efficient market hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970) is expected a market 
correction after the third day following the event. Last, but not least, should be 
mentioned that during the meantime of the tweet and sign of the effective ban, till the 
cease of the ban the market was flooded with information about the potential impact of 
the regulation. 
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4. Sample Selection and 
Methodology 
American companies take the second spot on the list of Huawei suppliers, counting 
23 firms as indicated by Reuters (Jourdan, 2019). The sample of the analysis consists of 
21 publicly listed companies on Nasdaq, 20 out of 23 from Reuters list, plus Alphabet, 
the parent company of Google whose Operating System, Android, are HUAWEI 
smartphones using. Moreover from the sample are excluded three firms: 
4.1. NeoPhotonics Corporation (NPTN) for two major reasons, i) 47% of revenues 
derive from doing business with Huawei and ii) is publicly listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, both are reasons for causing biasness on the results. 
4.2. Keysight Technologies because is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
4.3. Corning Incorporated because is listed on the New York Stock Exchange as well. 
The enterprises traded on the NYSE were excluded due to the use of the Nasdaq 
Composite index (^IXIC) as a market proxy throughout the models, in addition the 
same event study analysis is conducted for the NASDAQ 100 Technology Sector index 
(^NDXT) alone as a proxy of the market reaction. 
Table A lists the companies sampled for the analysis. The daily stock price data are 
retrieved from Yahoo Finance and transformed into daily returns, as the difference of 
the first natural logarithm.  
Following the instructions of MacKinlay (1997) is performed the initial task of 
defining the event of interest. Figure 1 shows the three event windows namely, 
estimation, event and post event window. Estimations window is set on the pre-event 
period suitable for estimating the parameters of the normal return model. Moreover, 
MacKinlay (1997) suggests that for the estimation of normal returns parameters the use 
of 120 days prior to the event is appropriate on event study with daily data. The event 
window is set to capture the abnormal returns of the stocks, known as the period of 
interest, defined as the time over which the stock price reaction is examined. Post-event 
window is set to investigate longer-term performance following the event, in this study 
will not be considered. An important note is that the windows must not overlap each 
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other, especially the estimation window to prevent the influence on the normal model 
parameters. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Event study 
[ Estimation Window ] [ Event Window ] 
[ Post Event 
Window ] 
            
T1 T2 T0  T3 t 
 Event day    
 
Normal Return Model 
 
 
Abnormal Return Model  
 
 
In order for the results to be consistent and to examine the first hypothesis of 
exogenous event, the estimation window length equals 120 observation days, up to 10 
observation days prior to the event, dated 15 of May 2019. While throughout the 
analysis the event window varies in order to control for robustness and capture the 
possibility of information leakage before the event. From now on as is denoted the 
abnormal estimation period, equal to T3-T2 varying from 1 to 20 days. Short-term event 
studies are the best in examining the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 
1970) under the assumption that the news will immediately reflect on firms' price 
change (MacKinlay, 1997). Especially short-window tests are powerful giving the 
“cleanest evidence on market efficiency” (Fama, 1991) and minimize the possibility of 
other factors influencing the results (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), this is why the 
analysis will concentrate on the shortest event windows. 
To claim that the event triggered abnormal returns, one must have the threshold 
of normal returns. Here a very severe question arises, among the various methods to 
measure returns, both normal and abnormal, which one is the best in practice? 
Following the Brown and Warner (1980) market model states that the expected 
stock return follows a single market return factor as stated equation is the following: 
           
              (1) 
Where     is the daily return of the stock price of  
  firm and   
  is the daily 
market return, while     is the error term with an expected mean of zero, respectively on 
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day t. Parameters   , the intercept, and   , the slope, are estimated through the method 
of ordinary least squares (OLS) throughout the estimation period and the market return 
for the same period (Arya and Zhang, 2009). Despite the simplicity, this model exhibits 
it does account for the sensitivity and the risk profile the firm exhibits through the 
unique betas for each firm observation, while allows controlling for external factors in 
the market. 
The abnormal return for each security for every day is calculated as the 
difference between the actual observed return during the event window and the 
expected return estimated during the event window. The equation stands as following: 
                 
          (2) 
Where     is the observed actual return for the day t and         
   is the 
market model expected return. 
In addition in the analysis is used the most common multi-factor model, the 
Fama French 3-factor model known as economic model (Fama and French, 1992). The 
need for using such a model is to receive better estimates on benchmark returns and 
adjust for outperformance or underperformance tendency. Fama French model has the 
following equation: 
      
        (  
    
 )                        (3) 
Where     is the daily return of the  
   firm at day t,   
  is a risk free asset return 
at day t, in this analysis as a risk free proxy is used the 12 month U.S. Treasury-Bill 
with data retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis,   
  is the daily market 
return at day t, while       
  and   
    
  are the stock excess return and market 
excess return respectively.      factor accounts for the size firm effect, small 
corporations use to outperform big ones, thereby this factors equal to the difference 
between the small to big firms and      factor accounts for the value premium, 
companies with high book-to-market value outperform the ones with small, thereby  this 
factor equals to the difference between the high value companies minus the small.      
and      factors are retrieved from Kenneth R. French data library 
(Mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu, 2019). Lastly     is the error term with an expected mean of 
zero, while   ,    ,    and    are parameters to be estimated. 
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On Fama French 3-factor model abnormal return equation is the following: 
     (      
 )         (  
    
 )                    (4) 
Lastly, in order to capture the case of non-symmetric effect on the firms, the 
assumption is that the blacklist affects the suppliers’ wealth only negatively, thus the 
sample is examined under the market model with exponential generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (E-GARCH) error estimation. Economic 
theory strongly suggests that negative news affect more than positive news, thereby the 
goal is to capture the excess variability, both during event window and estimation 
window, and count for leverage effect. E-GARCH (1,1) model equation is the same as 
the market model (1), while conditional variance may be written as (Nelson and Cao, 
1992): 
     
    ∑    
 
          ∑          
  
         (5)  
Where ,    and    are parameters to be estimated with maximum likelihood 
procedure.   
  is the conditional variance which being in logarithm has no sign 
restriction, allowing it be negative. Lastly         has the following form: 
              |  |           |  |         (6)  
Where   and   are parameters to be estimated and    a standard, generalized 
error variable. The abnormal return for each security is calculated according to equation 
(2), similarly to the market model. 
The null hypotheses for the abnormal return is zero abnormal return, meaning 
that there is no impact from the event to the respective firm price, which is tested 
through merely calculating the t-statistic for the every event window day: 
      
    
   
           (7) 
Where     is the regressions residual standard error, the standard deviation 
abnormal returns exhibit. 
Since the examined event windows are larger than a day a common procedure is 
aggregating the abnormal returns over time. Thereby the solo abnormal returns are 
cumulates over the days of the event window: 
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    ∑     
  
               (8) 
Alike the individual abnormal returns, the cumulative abnormal return null 
hypothesis is      . The t-statistic now is calculated as: 
     
   
    
           (9) 
Where      stands for the standard error of     multiplied by the squared 
number of the days in the event window (MacKinlay, 1997) 
Evidences suggest that the market model performs at least as good as any 
alternative model, while are proven the limited gains from using a more sophisticated 
model over the market model, because all the other factors have a small explanatory 
power over the market factor (Brown and Warner, 1980). Thereby the analysis of this 
study is based on the market model, while results from the other two models will be 
discussed in cases worthy to or controversy ones. 
The analysis is performed using Event study tool (Schimmer, Levchenko, & 
Müller, 2014) which has gained popularity (Schimmer, 2012) and (Kruppert, 2017), 
thereby the results are expected to be consistent. 
5. Empirical results and 
discussion 
The objective of this section is to examine wither the event has a significant 
effect on the stock price of the suppliers and the technology sector in general. Firstly is 
proved that the event is exogenous meaning that there was no information leakage on 
the market through studying the average abnormal returns and abnormal returns across 
the event window. Examination of cumulative abnormal returns and average cumulative 
abnormal returns follows tackling the case of persistence effect. Lastly is induced an 
abnormal volatility study counting for the case of excess risk after the event. 
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5.1. Abnormal return results 
Table 1 shows the average abnormal returns (AAR) of the 21 firms of interest 
for the period since 9 working days prior to the event, up to 10 days after, for all 3 
examined models. The most noteworthy result is that the day before the event 
announcement 18 out of 21 suppliers had a positive abnormal return, with the average 
abnormal return being 0,93%. E-Garch model and Fama French model compatible the 
result, with small deviation, counting 17 positive firm returns. Moreover, the event day 
and for the 3 following working days, the average abnormal returns turn to be negative, 
while the fourth working day following the event, ARR turns to positive again. The 
results confirm the hypothesis of exogenous event and the interpretation given is that 
the event information is spread gradually, gradual information-spread effect, with the 
sign of the two acts from president Trump, thereby the first day following the event is 
experienced the most severe impact from it. AAR the day following the event has the 
value of -3,3%, with 18 firms experiencing negative abnormal return, while on E-Garch 
model, accounting for extra volatility and extreme negative observations, the swarm is 
19. AAR is nothing more than the sum of the abnormal return (2) of the firm sample for 
the respective day of the event window, divided from the sample size, N, here 21. 
Depending on the model of reference at time   the respective equation is: 
    
 
 
∑     
 
             (10) 
 
Table 1: Daily Average Abnormal Return over the event window 
Day Obs 
Market Model E-GARCH Model FAMA 3-factor 
Actual AAR Pos:Neg 
Actual 
AAR 
Pos:Neg Actual AAR Pos:Neg 
-9 21 0,85% 14:07 0,83% 14:07 0,87% 14:07 
-8 21 -0,94% 8:13 -0,99% 7:14 -0,87% 8:13 
-7 21 -0,86% 4:17 -0,87% 3:18 -0,83% 4:17 
-6 21 0,05% 12:09 0,08% 14:07 0,04% 13:08 
-5 21 -0,46% 7:14 -0,47% 7:14 -0,54% 8:13 
-4 21 -1,51% 9:12 -1,52% 8:13 -1,64% 4:17 
-3 21 0,02% 8:13 0,00% 9:12 -0,06% 7:14 
-2 21 -0,96% 7:14 -0,90% 7:14 -0,94% 6:15 
-1 21 0,93% 18:03 0,89% 17:04 0,85% 17:04 
0 21 -0,57% 6:15 -0,61% 6:15 -0,53% 5:16 
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1 21 -3,33% 3:18 -3,37% 2:19 -3,37% 3:18 
2 21 -1,40% 5:16 -1,39% 5:16 -1,35% 5:16 
3 21 -1,37% 5:16 -1,36% 5:16 -1,34% 4:17 
4 21 0,76% 15:06 0,72% 15:06 0,75% 16:05 
5 21 -1,32% 7:14 -1,33% 7:14 -1,27% 7:14 
6 21 0,16% 10:11 0,18% 10:11 0,16% 10:11 
7 21 -0,39% 6:15 -0,41% 6:15 -0,41% 7:14 
8 21 -0,82% 3:18 -0,83% 4:17 -0,82% 4:17 
9 21 1,14% 15:06 1,14% 15:06 1,11% 15:06 
10 21 0,08% 12:09 0,06% 12:09 0,13% 13:08 
 
 
Moreover, the results confirm the intuition of examining short-event windows 
under the assumption that the market reacted only after the announcement of the new 
regulation, while the third day following the announcement the regulation was ceased, 
which is reflected on the market with a positive reaction. On Graph 1 is depicted the 
daily average abnormal return and median abnormal return move for the 21 Huawei 
suppliers. The drop during the event day zero seems to persist and vanish only after the 
announcement of ceasing the regulation. Besides, is observed decouple between the two 
series the following day of the event, thereby on that day is recorded an extreme 
negative abnormal return on one or more observation. 
 
Graph 1: Plot of AAR and Median AR of Market Model 
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Table 2: Percentage Median and Average Abnormal Return per day 
Day -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Median 1.02 -0.51 -2.08 -1.16 -1.13 0.94 -1.16 -0.16 -0.60 -1.21 0.99 0.1 
Average 0.93 -0.57 -3.33 -1.40 -1.37 0.76 -1.32 0.16 -0.39 -0.82 1.14 0.0 
 
 
Table 2 reports the percentage median abnormal return and the average 
abnormal return of the sample per day. One should note that for every event window 
examined day the average abnormal returns is lower than the corresponding median 
ones, indicating that the magnitude of negative returns is higher than the positive ones. 
This is in line with the assumption that negative socks tend to impact more and that the 
market is more prone to negative news (Galil and Soffer, 2011). In particular, the impact 
the day after the event is -3,3% on average, while the median value of the day is 
-2,08%. 
 
Table 3: Robustness tests over Average Abnormal Returns 
Test statistic AAR(-1) AAR(0) AAR(1) AAR(2) AAR(3) AAR(4) 
Patell Z 1,7438* -0,6301 -7,0725*** -3,2494*** -3,4206*** 1,5514 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
3,3464*** -1,8915** -3,2009*** -2,328** -2,328** 2,037** 
Corrado T 1,2506 -0,6591 -2,1833** -1,4253 -1,4008 1,1353 
Generalized 
Rank T 
1,4209 -0,9112 -1,9181* -1,548 -1,4372 1,4278 
Adjusted Patell Z 1,7451* -0,6306 -7,0778*** -3,2518*** -3,4232*** 1,5525 
Generalized 
Rank Z 
3,28*** -2,1054** -4,417*** -3,5674*** -3,3112*** 3,2862*** 
                              
 
In order to confirm the findings, a series of tests are conducted. Table 3 shows 
the results of the tests; interestingly the average abnormal return on the day of the event 
is insignificant, signaling the failure to reject the null hypothesis of no average 
abnormal return on that day. The following day of the event, the Patell Z test (Patell, 
1976) is significant at 0,00% level, and holds significant for the three days following the 
event. On the other hand, the Corrado T-test (Corrado and Zivney, 1992) is significant 
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only for the day following the event. Thereby there is strong evidence supporting the 
assumption of exogeneity, while further investigation over the abnormal returns follows 
through examining the firm-specific reaction over the event. 
 
Table 4: Firm daily percentage Abnormal Return (Market model) 
 Firm 
Day -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Alphabet  -2,28** 2,6** 0,20 -0,31 -0,46 -0,24 0,63 
Lumentum 1,02 -3,36 -14,23*** -5,84 -1,10 1,64 -0,97 
Qorvo 1,11 -0,72 -8,6*** -5,00** -2,38 -0,89 -1,61 
Finisar 0,22 -1,22 -4,8** -1,67 0,59 1,02 -1,71 
II-VI 3,25 -0,71 -6,49** -3,43 3,44 2,54 -3,23 
Skyworks 0,57 -0,50 -7,37** -3,67* -1,13 1,25 -1,16 
Broadcom 1,59 -0,51 -3,5** -1,81 -5,05*** -0,25 -2,08 
QUALCOMM 1,61 -0,86 -4,99* -1,07 -5,36** 0,48 -11,4*** 
Flex Ltd 2,96* 0,84 -1,87 -1,28 -3,35** -0,10 -2,22 
Maxim 0,04 0,07 -1,74 -0,52 -0,39 0,79 1,07 
Seagate 0,06 0,83 -0,90 0,17 0,56 1,95 -2,68 
Marvell Tech 1,88 -0,58 -1,28 -1,16 -2,61 1,61 1,16 
Analog 1,14 -0,17 -4,09*** -2,96** -2,14 1,22 1,81 
CommScop 0,81 -1,02 0,04 1,27 -1,78 -0,05 -2,26 
AMD 1,43 -1,63 -0,68 0,40 0,16 0,01 1,14 
Micron 1,21 -2,01 -4,39** -1,62 -1,59 1,23 -1,77 
NVIDIA 0,5 -3,26 -1,06 -0,19 -0,23 0,52 -0,79 
Texas 0,51 -0,11 -2,08 -1,25 -0,51 0,94 0,17 
Western Dig 2,23 0,39 -2,17 0,46 -4,13* 2,07 -2,29 
Intel -0,18 -0,12 -1,13 -0,36 -1,54 0,99 -0,58 
Microsoft -0,23 0,06 1,13 0,44 0,14 -0,74 1,05 
NASDAQ-100 0,68 -0,09 -0,83 -0,55 -1,40*** 0,60 -0,53 
                              
 
Table 4 presents the daily abnormal returns of the firm sample, plus the Nasdaq-
100 technology index, of the market model. The results show that during the event date 
there is no significant abnormal move on the suppliers’ stock price, the only exception 
is Alphabet, provider of the Operating System Huawei’s telephones run on, although the 
return is positive, thereby not affected from the event of interest. The day after the 
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event, 9 companies exhibit significant negative abnormal returns and, as already 
mentioned, 18 out of 21 experience a negative abnormal return on that day. This delay 
on the market reaction can be related to the time needed for the information to spread 
among the market participants and confirm the validity of the statement, while the lack 
of the actual time the two Acts were signed supports the market reaction delay. 
As expected the more a company is cooperating with Huawei, the more exposed 
it is on losing revenues, thereby the more affected by the event. Table A shows the 
exposure for each company, as a percentage of its revenues and in real values. The day 
following  the event the significantly affected companies have the respective exposure 
as percentage of their revenues: (Lumentum 11%, Qorvo 11%, Finisar 8%, II-VI 8%, 
Skyworks 6%, Broadcom 6%, Qualcomm 5%), while Analog and Micron are exposed 
much lower at 3% and 2% respectively. When it comes to Micron, it figures 5
th
 on the 
list with revenues in real values. 
When it comes to the third day following the event only four firms have 
significant abnormal return, Broadcom, Qualcomm and Flex which top on the list with 
revenues from Huawei in real values. This day is Monday 20
th
 of May, the day of 
postponing the effective ban for several months, yet the lack of the exact time the pause 
announcement was released may influence the assumptions, but the two interpretations 
are: 
i) The Monday effect (Cross, 1973), that stock prices on Mondays have the 
tendency to follow the trend of Fridays and/or underperform, while in addition 
most of the negative announcements are released on Fridays, after market 
closure. This may be true and according to the asymmetry spread of information 
it may take several days to evaluate the real event effect. 
ii) The second, more economic interpretation behind the result is that with the 
announcement of the blacklist postpone the market participants realized that the 
act is not temporary. Despite the fact that congress is giving time to the market 
to tackle the new reality these three corporations have by far the most revenues 
coming from Huawei in real values, thereby is questioned the ability to cover 
such a huge revenue gap from other businesses. 
Trying to have a generic view on the sector reaction the Nasdaq-100 technology 
index is studied, which exhibits significant abnormal return only during the third day 
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after the event. The abnormal return has a magnitude of -1,40% and is significant at 1% 
level, while from the event day till the third following day the abnormal returns are 
negative, yet not significant. The two above interpretations stand here as well and when 
it comes to the second one, taking into account the perception that stock prices reflect 
the future earnings and cash flows of an enterprise, is questioned here the potential 
growth of the sector in the long run, whereas for the short run the postpone of the 
effective ban secures the business underway, thereby the market is discounting the loss 
of a major customer in the future. 
5.2. Cumulative analysis results 
In order to measure the impact of the event over the event window and the 
persistence of the effect, one should add up the individual abnormal returns and 
examine the cumulative abnormal returns. The most common practice, especially on 
short-term event windows, is studying a three day event window (Schimmer, 2012). 
Taking into consideration that after the first announcement of the effective ban, details 
for the potential impact and statements from different market participants flooded the 
news, the following event windows are studied: (-9,10), (-3,3), (-1,1), (0,1), (0,2), (0,3), 
(0,5) and (0,10). 
 
Table 3: Percentage CAR per event window (Market model) 
Firm      Window  (-9, 10) (-3, 3) (-1,1) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
Alphabet 2,06 0,75 0,52 2,80* 2,49 2,03 2,42 2,01 
Lumentum -24,83 -23,24** -16,57** -17,59** -23,43** -24,53** -23,86** -25,88** 
Qorvo -11,73* -16,89** -8,21** -9,32** -14,32** -16,70** -19,20** -13,32** 
Finisar -9,49 -8,22 -5,80* -6,02** -7,69** -7,10* -7,79* -7,70 
II-VI 1,48 -6,23 -3,95 -7,20* -10,63** -7,19 -7,88 -4,32 
Skyworks -17,32** -16,71** -7,30** -7,87** -11,54** -12,67** -12,58** -9,94 
Broadcom -21,06** -10,23** -2,42 -4,01* -5,82** -10,87** -13,20** -17,04** 
QUALCOMM -26,05** -8,58 -4,24 -5,85 -6,92 -12,28** -23,20** -26,61** 
Flex -18,88** -4,21 1,93 -1,03 -2,31 -5,66* -7,98** -11,38** 
Maxim -6,07 -5,90* -1,63 -1,67 -2,19 -2,58 -0,72 0,62 
Seagate -2,45 -3,13 -0,01 -0,07 0,10 0,66 -0,07 0,88 
Marvell Tech -8,39 -6,02 0,02 -1,86 -3,02 -5,63* -2,86 -3,21 
Analog  -12,70* -11,24** -3,12 -4,26** -7,22** -9,36** -6,33* -7,77 
CommScope -28,32** -0,47 -0,17 -0,98 0,29 -1,49 -3,80 -6,60 
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AMD 16,70 3,45 -0,88 -2,31 -1,91 -1,75 -0,60 6,59 
Micron -11,09 -7,63 -5,19 -6,40** -8,02** -9,61** -10,15* -9,95 
NVIDIA -9,56 -4,84 -3,82 -4,32 -4,51 -4,74 -5,01 -8,31 
Texas Instr -4,49 -4,70 -1,68 -2,19 -3,44 -3,95 -2,84 -2,06 
Western Dig -15,81 -6,12 0,45 -1,78 -1,32 -5,45 -5,67 -8,81 
Intel  -5,55 -4,02 -1,43 -1,25 -1,61 -3,15 -2,74 1,37 
Microsoft 4,36 3,51 0,96 1,19 1,63 1,77 2,08 2,93 
                    
 
Table 4: Percentage CAR Fama 3-F and E-GARCH models 
 
Firm                        Window 
 
FAMA 3-Factor E-GARCH 
(-3, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
Alphabet Inc 1,04 2,59 2,46 
Lumentum Holdings Inc. -24,55** -28,31** -34,78** 
Qorvo, Inc.  -17,20** -18,98** -12,93** 
Finisar -8,51* -6,85 -5,52 
II-VI Incorporated -5,98 -7,92 -4,22 
Skyworks Solutions Inc. -16,93** -13,43** -11,90* 
Broadcom Inc.  -10,67** -13,30** -17,06** 
QUALCOMM Incorporated -8,44 -21,76** -23,67** 
Flex Ltd -4,04 -7,88** -11,09** 
Maxim Integrated Products -6,02* -0,83 0,38 
Seagate Technology plc -3,16 1,46 3,75 
Marvell Technology Group -6,18 -3,23 -3,89 
Analog Devices -11,41** -5,45 -6,15 
CommScope Holding 
Company 
-0,06 -5,14 -8,46 
Advanced Micro Devices 3,96 0,28 7,87 
Micron Technology -7,52 -9,66* -9,02 
NVIDIA Corporation -5,20 -6,41 -10,21 
Texas Instruments 
Incorporated 
-4,78 -2,44 -1,41 
Western Digital Corporation -5,66 -5,59 -8,70 
Intel Corporation -3,78 -3,07 0,96 
Microsoft Corporation 3,34 1,95 2,61 
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Table 3 presents the individual firm CAR in percentage per event window. The 
findings support the assumption that the most affected companies are the ones doing the 
most business with Huawei. The event window with the most significant CARs is the 
(0,3) counting 10 firms negatively significant affected. Event windows (0,1) and (0,5) 
count 9 firms significantly affected, but CAR(0,1) of Alphabet is positively affected by 
2.8% which is controversy to what expected. The results of the other two models, Fama 
and French and E-Garch, are in accordance with the market model ones, with the only 
exception the Table 4 reported results. Noteworthy is that E-Garch model reports, 7 
firms significantly affected 5 days after the event, excluding the marginally significant 
ones, and 10 days after the event reports Lumentum negatively affected by -34,78% 
while the other two models report -25%. Since there may be other factors that could 
affect the reaction on this long time horizon will keep an eye on the short term. For 
instance after 3 days, the most exposed as a percentage of the revenues, are negatively 
affected by -24,53% the Lumentum, -16,70% the Qorvo and -7,10% the Finisar. While 
the most exposed companies in actual revenues values are negatively affected by 
-5,66% the Flex, -10,87% the Broadcom and -12,28% the Qualcomm. 
In order one to understand the importance of the exposure a firm has, 10 days 
after the event Flex is affected by -11,38%, Broadcom by -17,04%, Qualcomm by 
-26,61% and Qorvo -12,32%. Concluding in a manner originally expected that there is a 
strong correlation between exposure and affection, leading to persistent effect. 
 Up to now the analysis was able to judge for individual firm affection, but in 
order to draw a generic conclusion of the event effect, one should aggregate the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the firm sample and study the average cumulative 
abnormal return (CAAR), defined as: 
     
 
 
∑     
 
             (11) 
Where      is the cumulative abnormal return for the respective  
   firm over 
the corresponding event window and   is the sample sum. 
In order to test for significance a cross-sectional t-statistic test is calculated 
under the following equation: 
      √ 
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Where       the sample cumulative abnormal returns standard deviation, which 
is calculated as (Schimmer et al., 2014): 
     
  
 
   
∑            
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Again the null hypothesis is that average cumulative abnormal return equals zero. 
 
Table 5: Sample CAAR results and Technology-100 index CAR 
Test statistic (-9, 10) (-1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
CAAR Value -9,9% -2,9% -3,9% -5,3% -6,7% -7,2% -7,0% 
Pos:Neg CAR 4:17 5:16 2:19 4:17 3:18 2:19 6:15 
Observations (N) 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Patell Z -4,89 -3,44 -5,45 -6,32 -7,19 -6,15 -4,31 
t-value -4,14 -3,28 -4,07 -4,01 -4,79 -4,38 -3,71 
Gen Sign Z -2,76 -2,33 -3,64 -2,76 -3,20 -3,64 -1,89 
Corrado -1,63 -0,96 -2,04 -2,49 -2,82 -2,25 -1,67 
Gen Rank T -1,94 -1,50 -1,78 -1,71 -1,98 -1,84 -1,51 
Adj Patell Z -2,30 -1,62 -2,57 -2,98 -3,39 -2,90 -2,03 
GenRank T -4,47 -3,47 -4,11 -3,95 -4,55 -4,24 -3,48 
Skewness Cor T -3,65 -5,00 -6,15 -5,96 -6,88 -5,96 -4,58 
Technology 100 CAR -6,1% -0,4% -1,1% -1,6% -3,1% -3,1% -3,3% 
Tech-100  t-value -2,31 -0,43 -1,26 -1,60 -2,58 -2,13 -1,70 
 
 
The first part of Table 5 shows that cumulative average abnormal return is 
negative for all the examined event windows, while at least one robustness test confirms 
the findings. The highest effect is experienced on the 20 day event window (-9,10) with 
CAAR value of -9,93%, reported Patell test and t-value significant at 0,00% level. The 
most robust results, if one can say, are found on the 4 day event window (0,3) where 
CAAR value is -6,7% with reported t-value and Pattel test significant at 0,00% level, 
Corrado test significant at 1,06% level and Generalized Rank T-test (Kolari and 
Pynnönen, 2011) at 6,16% level. Noteworthy is that out of the 21 firm CAR, 19 have a 
negative sign on the two day cumulating window (0,1), indicating that the two days 
abnormal return sum of these firms is negative. This gives the notion that the market 
reacted as expected, negatively. With a closer look, the only two companies without 
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negative CAR are Microsoft, which has less than 1% of its revenues exposed and 
Alphabet. 
The case of Alphabet, the parent company of Google, which is not affected by 
the event as one could expect, since Huawei smartphones use Google’s operating 
system. Moreover the following days of the event, Google stated that in compliance 
with the new regulation will gradually stop the updates on Huawei smartphones. This 
sequel of events leaves Alphabet returns unaffected, at least at the mind of investors, as 
interpretation one can state the fact that more than 70% of Alphabet revenues derive 
from marketing related business, thus a small fraction of the revenues will be instantly 
affected. Even though Huawei stated the development of its own operating system one 
can say that the market is conscious about the ability to do so, but no one can argue the 
potential of losing a major customer and major player in the biggest retail market in the 
world. 
Back to the analysis, results obtained from the second part of Table 5 show the 
cumulative abnormal return for the Technology-100 index over the event windows. 
Consistent with the previous results, of the average cumulative over the sample, the 
index is experiencing negative values throughout the examined windows. Yet results are 
not significant overall windows, the most severe ones are observed on the (-9,10) 
window, with CAR value of -6,1% significant at 2,26% level, (0,3) window with CAR 
value of -3,05% significant at 1,11% level, (0,5) windows with CAR value of -3,08% 
significant at 3,52% level and (0,10) window with CAR value of -3,3% and marginally 
significant at 9,17% level. 
Results reported on Table 5 are obtained from the market model while there is 
no significant change in comparison to the results of E-Garch and Fama Frienh models. 
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Graph 2: Plot of CAAR  
 
 
 
Graph 2 depicts the plot of cumulative average abnormal returns for several 
event windows studied, starting from the event date and on. As presented the negative 
average abnormal returns add up until at least 5 days after the event, while 10 days after 
the event the CAAR is affected by -7%, with Pattel test still significant at the 0,00% 
level. Despite that individual abnormal returns do not stand significant for the whole 
event window, the cumulative ones hold significant giving the notion that the gradual 
information spread prolongs the effect. This does not exclusively mean that one is 
delayed informed, which should be true as well, but also that there is uncertainty in the 
market from the continuous information drift, about which companies are affected, up 
to what level and what the response strategy of each enterprise will be. The gradually 
public released studies about the potential effect can be opposite from the behavioral 
theory that investors hold strong biasness and confidence over their own information to 
public ones, resulting in an underreaction to public information (Daniel et al., 1998). On 
the other hand, there is a group of investors who ignores the news and reacts only to 
price movements (Hong and Stein, 1999), causing underreaction to news and 
overreaction to price changes. 
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5.3. Studying abnormal volatility 
Due to the interest of the risk the stocks expose related to the event, a volatility 
event study is imposed focusing on the volatility return of the sample. Volatility can be 
decomposed into systematic, market-industry related, and idiosyncratic, specific firm 
related. According to the risk management, higher volatility equals to higher risk, 
thereby for an investor and portfolio management is very important to outline the 
volatility stock has.  Thus this part of the study is set to test wither the event has a 
significant effect on the volatilities of the firms sampled. A GARCH (1,1) model is 
estimated, following (Agrawal, Bharath and Viswanathan, 2003) methodology.  The 
market model with GARCH errors (Bollerslev, 1986) and a dummy variable,   , as an 
indicator variable for event window days in both, the mean and the volatility function 
can be written as: 
           
   
 
               (14) 
With conditional variance equation: 
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Where     is a dummy variable taking the value of 1, the event day and 
onward, depending on the event window examined, and 0 otherwise. Then a 
Wilcoxon sign test (Wilcoxon, 1945) is performed on the estimated volatility 
returns for pre-event volatility ratios (  
   
) versus post-event ratios (  
    
). 
Lambdas volatility ratios are calculated as: 
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And    
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Where    denotes the calculated volatility for the respective  
   firm and    the 
market volatility for two separate periods, prior and after the event. 
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Table 6: Volatility analysis results 
Window 
 
(0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5) (0,10) (0,50) 
Firm pre L post L post L post L post L post L post L 
Alphabet 1.34 16.06 2.17 2.00 1.80 1.66 2.22 
Lumentum 3.50 70.06 4.68 3.61 4.83 4.39 3.56 
Qorvo 1.67 50.50 3.63 2.67 2.91 3.40 2.63 
Finisar 1.53 23.13 1.53 1.33 1.74 1.73 1.32 
II-VI 2.69 37.81 2.96 2.62 3.38 3.21 2.36 
Skyworks 1.81 44.19 3.12 2.30 2.86 2.77 2.43 
Broadcom 1.53 19.56 1.54 2.11 2.24 2.22 2.46 
QUALCOMM 2.01 26.50 1.76 2.07 4.07 3.87 2.70 
Flex 1.47 17.81 1.71 2.00 2.03 1.91 3.00 
Maxim 1.35 12.38 1.18 1.03 1.32 1.58 1.64 
Seagate 1.76 11.94 1.30 1.11 1.99 2.06 1.98 
Marvell Tech 1.60 5.44 1.25 1.62 2.12 2.33 1.98 
Analog  1.41 25.38 2.15 1.67 2.41 2.23 2.20 
CommScope 2.12 5.69 0.39 1.36 1.57 1.96 2.16 
AMD 3.16 3.75 1.50 1.63 1.80 3.74 3.14 
Micron 2.23 16.56 1.40 1.25 2.24 2.29 3.33 
NVIDIA 2.82 11.94 1.14 1.11 1.67 1.57 2.45 
Texas Instr 1.42 13.38 1.42 1.14 1.48 1.48 1.95 
Western Dig 2.26 17.38 1.36 2.51 2.96 2.63 3.50 
Intel  1.50 7.38 0.98 1.27 1.54 1.67 1.57 
Microsoft 1.28 5.50 1.25 1.30 1.16 1.15 1.32 
NASDAQ-100 1.18 5.69 1.18 1.38 1.54 1.39 1.42 
 
Results in Table 6 indicate the before the event calculated Lambdas and the 
calculated ones for 6 different event windows after. Specifically the day following the 
event day, thus in the very short run the sample is experiencing high volatility; 
interestingly even the Nasdaq-100 technology index suffers for high volatility. The 
difference in this short run between the two periods is 191% higher on average. One 
should question the significance of the results, this why a Wilcoxon test and cross 
sectional t-test is conducted. 
Table 7: Wilcoxon sign rank test 
Window (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,5) (0,10) (0,50) 
W-value 0 97 102 54 26 26 
Average Difference 19.137 -0.095 -0.129 0.366 0.449 0.450 
Median Difference 14.720 -0.023 0.020 0.462 0.376 0.383 
Z-value -4.010 -0.643 -0.469 -2.138 -3.263 -3.110 
Cross-Sec t-test 1.060 1.910 2.441 2.441 2.615 1.555 
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Table 7 shows the results of robustness tests for abnormal volatilities. Cross 
sectional test for volatilities is insignificant only for the very short run period of one day 
following the event, failing to reject the null hypothesis of no difference among the 
abnormal volatilities of the sample, interpreting homogeneous reaction in accordance 
with the Nasdaq-100 technology index result, indicating high abnormal volatility as an 
industry proxy. Whereas Wilcoxon test shows powerful results significant at 0,00% 
level for this short run. Up to 5 days after the event results show no significant abnormal 
volatility, whereas for the 5 day window results are controversy, with z-value 
significant on the one hand and on the other w-value insignificant. On the 10 day 
window, both Wilcoxon test and t-test for abnormal volatility are significant at 0,11% 
and 1,66% level respectively. On even longer event window of 50 days Wilcoxon test is 
still significant at 0,2% whereas t-test is insignificant, however, this study is not 
designed for such a long horizon event study, thus the case of a permanent change on 
the systematic or idiosyncratic risk after the event is a case for further research beyond 
this study. To conclude the findings show a skyrocketing increase in the abnormal 
volatility the day after the event and significant raise in the 10 days window. These are 
not surprising; due to the previous discussion about the uncertainty among market 
participants for the forthcoming results of the new regulation and previous literature 
findings that non-routine news and events lead to more dominant volatility increases 
(Neuhierl, Scherbina and Schlusche, 2013). 
6. Conclusion 
The rising political and economic integration leads to uncertainties affecting the 
markets in an unprecedented way, a mere tweet or post on social media are proved 
enough to trigger catastrophic impact.  
This study focused on the tweet of United States of America President Donald 
Trump and the sign of the Act blacklisting Huawei and not only baring the ability to sell 
in the American market but also supplied from it. Since the tweet and the sign of the 
two Acts were realized on the same day, one is able to tell the exact time when market 
participants learned the news. The study sampled the American Huawei suppliers and 
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utilizing event study methodologies aimed to answer the following questions: Did the 
Huawei suppliers’ wealth shrink after the governments’ decision? If so, what 
characteristics do influence this reaction and was the effect persisted? Was the effect 
spread to the whole technology sector? And lastly, did the new regulation induce an 
additional risk to the influenced firms’? 
The results show a strong negative response after the spread of the news in the 
market, in accordance with the existing literature findings that, average stock returns are 
lower following bad news announcements (Maher and Parikh, 2011); (Spyrou, 
Kassimatis and Galariotis, 2007) and (Stefanescu, Dumitriu and Nistor, 2012). Looking 
at individual enterprises the findings show a strong relationship between the levels of 
exposure, inferred as a percentage of revenues from cooperation with Huawei or the 
actual amount of revenues, and negative returns. In addition, the day of ceasing the 
regulation findings show a negative reaction for the enterprises with the highest 
exposure in real values. Information at a very short time easily travel, but as one can 
expect it takes time for the market to digest new information (Wagner, Zeckhauser and 
Ziegler, 2018), while the investors response may be slow in order to validate the new 
information, since with the same great ease and short time, if not more efficient, rumors 
and misleading information spread among the network ties (Bollen, Mao and Zeng, 
2011). Especially in this case where there is unclear who are affected and to what 
extent. Moreover, investors’ reaction to news and uncertainty is far from homogeneous; 
some are feedback traders while others would not arbitrage away since shorting is 
expensive (Chan, 2003). These lead to a relatively high negative overall market 
response and a downward trend in cumulative abnormal returns across most of the 
companies and average cumulative abnormal returns. Again the more exposed a 
company is the more persistent the effect is. Lastly, is clear that the day following the 
event there is a boom in the volatility and risk not only on the sampled companies but in 
the sector in general. However, it is unclear if the regulation triggered higher levels of 
risk in the enterprises of interest and the industry in general, while the cease of the Act 
possibly played a role here, one cannot draw a clear conclusion. 
Some policy macroeconomic implementations of the findings are the following: 
Economic theory strongly suggests that protectionisms cause more harm to the 
economy than delivering benefits and boost, while uncertainty is the number one driver 
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of slowing investments and economic activity. Moreover, theory implements that 
increased regulation triggers positive effects on firms’ values in the related industry as 
soon as it becomes available. According to the normative analysis of positive theory, a 
regulation is implied to correct the market failures, thereby to maximize the social 
welfare. In this case, the failure is the potential loss of personal and governmental data, 
on the altar of losing a major customer for technology enterprises. To the extent of the 
research, only negative effects are counted, unfortunately, an event study can just tell 
what the impact on shareholders was, not the overall social effect (Lamdin, 2001). The 
effect on the process of installing the high-speed 5G mobile network might be severe, 
delaying the final retail use up to 5 years, which can lead costumers to pay more for 
worsen services (Qing, 2018). The barring of Huawei from the American market is 
driven by commercial and political interests, just like the USA-China trade conflict, 
with no real economic foundation. Since financial markets are crucial for economic 
growth, policymakers should pay high attention to the stock market dynamics and avoid 
negative policies, especially the ones generating systematic risk. Late studies show that 
investors are conscious about the significantly exposed in foreign markets American 
companies (Wagner, Zeckhauser and Ziegler, 2018).  
An event study is proved to be a useful tool for studying the impact of events. If 
many analysts independently were to study a one-shot sock event on the market, such as 
a split, the findings would likely be identical. However, if many analysts independently 
were to study a regulatory change event, the results would likely differ due to the 
different perspectives of the analyses conducted (Lamdin, 1999. This shortcoming of 
event studies, especially in the short-run can tell the economists only how the investors 
believe the new policy will affect a firm, with the results being poor predictors of the 
true effect of the new Act (Reynolds, 2005). 
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Appendix 
Table A: List of HUAWEI U.S. suppliers and their exposure 
   TICKER COMPANY 
Percentage of 
Revenues from 
Huawei 
Revenues from 
Huawei 
(Millions of 
yuan) 
1 GOOG Alphabet Inc N/A N/A 
2 LITE Lumentum Holdings Inc. 11 223 
3 QRVO Qorvo, Inc.  11 651 
4 FNSR Finisar 8 164 
-41- 
5 IIVI II-VI Incorporated 8 165 
6 SWKS Skyworks Solutions, Inc 6 441 
7 AVGO Broadcom Inc.  6 2.090 
8 QCOM QUALCOMM Incorporated 5 1.580 
9 FLEX Flex Ltd 5 2.430 
10 MXIM Maxim Integrated Products 4 149 
11 STX Seagate Technology plc 4 829 
12 MRVL Marvell Technology Group 3 120 
13 ADI Analog Devices 3 338 
14 COMM 
CommScope Holding 
Company 
2 188 
15 AMD Advanced Micro Devices 2 268 
16 MU Micron Technology 2 768 
17 NVDA NVIDIA Corporation 1 145 
18 TXN Texas Instruments 1 179 
19 WDC Western Digital Corporation 1 256 
20 INTC Intel Corporation 1 589 
21 MSFT Microsoft Corporation <1 190 
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Table B: Plot of Abnormal Returns 
 
 
  
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Alphabet 0 -0. 0.2 0.9 0.9 -0. 0.1 0.1 0.9 -2. 2.6 0.2 -0. -0. -0. 0.6 0.7 -0. 0.4 -0. -0.
Lumentum 0 1.5 -1. -2. 2.3 0.0 0.0 -0. 0.9 1.0 -3. -14 -5. -1. 1.6 -0. 0.8 0.3 -2. -0. -0.
Qorvo 0 1.8 -4. -0. 1.6 3.7 -0. -0. -1. 1.1 -0. -8. -5. -2. -0. -1. 2.7 2.5 -2. 3.1 -0.
Finisar 0 1.0 0.9 -0. -0. -1. -0. -0. -1. 0.2 -1. -4. -1. 0.5 1.0 -1. -0. 1.1 -0. -0. 0.2
II-VI 0 2.7 3.6 -0. 1.2 -1. 0.2 -0. -2. 3.3 -0. -6. -3. 3.4 2.5 -3. -0. 2.8 -0. 0.9 0.4
Skyworks 0 2.8 -5. -0. -1. 1.0 0.0 -1. -3. 0.6 -0. -7. -3. -1. 1.2 -1. 1.8 1.4 -1. 1.7 -0.
Broadcom 0 -1. -1. -1. 0.2 -1. 0.4 -0. -0. 1.6 -0. -3. -1. -5. -0. -2. -2. -1. -0. 0.3 0.4
QUALCOMM 0 0.8 1.1 -1. -2. -0. -0. 2.2 -0. 1.6 -0. -5. -1. -5. 0.4 -11 -0. -3. -1. 0.9 0.8
Flex Ltd 0 -1. -1. -0. -1. -3. -1. 0.4 -1. 3.0 0.8 -1. -1. -3. -0. -2. -1. -2. -0. 0.7 -0.
Maxim 0 1.0 -1. -2. 0.5 -1. 0.0 -0. -3. 0.0 0.1 -1. -0. -0. 0.7 1.0 1.2 -1. -2. 2.7 0.7
Seagate 0 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.3 -2. -0. -3. 0.1 0.8 -0. 0.1 0.5 1.9 -2. -0. -1. -0. 3.4 0.1
Marvell Tech 0 0.1 -2. -0. -0. 0.1 -1. 0.2 -2. 1.9 -0. -1. -1. -2. 1.6 1.1 -0. -1. -2. 3.7 0.2
Analog 0 1.9 -1. -1. 0.6 -2. 0.2 -0. -2. 1.1 -0. -4. -2. -2. 1.2 1.8 -1. -0. -1. 1.6 0.0
CommScop 0 -1. 0.2 0.1 -0. -1. -19 1.2 -1. 0.8 -1. 0.0 1.2 -1. -0. -2. -0. -0. -3. 0.4 1.4
AMD 0 5.7 -3. -1. 1.5 2.1 1.3 2.5 1.3 1.4 -1. -0. 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.1 -0. -0. 10. -1. -0.
Micron 0 1.9 -0. -1. -1. -0. -0. -0. 1.7 1.2 -2. -4. -1. -1. 1.2 -1. 0.0 0.4 -2. 2.4 -0.
NVIDIA 0 2.1 -2. -0. 0.0 1.2 -1. -0. 0.1 0.5 -3. -1. -0. -0. 0.5 -0. -0. -1. -0. -0. -0.
Texas 0 1.1 -1. -1. 0.3 -1. 0.0 0.2 -1. 0.5 -0. -2. -1. -0. 0.9 0.1 0.6 -0. -1. 1.6 0.8
Western Dig 0 -1. -0. -1. -2. -0. 0.0 -1. -1. 2.2 0.4 -2. 0.4 -4. 2.0 -2. 0.5 -1. -2. 1.3 -0.
Intel 0 -0. 0.8 0.1 0.5 -2. -5. -1. 0.3 -0. -0. -1. -0. -1. 0.9 -0. 2.8 0.0 -1. 2.2 0.8
Microsoft 0 -1. 0.3 -0. 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.8 -0. 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.1 -0. 1.0 0.5 -0. 0.3 -0. 0.2
NASDAQ-100 0 0.3 -1. -0. -0. -0. -0. -0. -0. 0.7 -0. -0. -0. -1. 0.6 -0. -0. -0. -0. 0.2 0.2
-10.00%
-5.00%
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Table C: Abnormal Return results and t-values (market model) 
 
AR(-9) t-value AR(-8) t-value AR(-7) t-value AR(-6) t-value 
Alphabet  0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.84 0.01 0.83 
Lumentum 0.02 0.39 -0.01 -0.36 -0.03 -0.69 0.02 0.59 
Qorvo 0.02 1.15 -0.04 -2.62 0.00 -0.31 0.02 1.07 
Finisar 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.45 -0.01 -0.48 0.00 -0.08 
II-VI 0.03 0.93 0.04 1.22 -0.01 -0.30 0.01 0.40 
Skyworks 0.03 1.50 -0.05 -2.90 -0.01 -0.33 -0.01 -0.58 
Broadcom -0.01 -0.63 -0.02 -1.03 -0.01 -0.66 0.00 0.12 
QUALCOMM 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.42 -0.01 -0.40 -0.02 -0.90 
Flex Ltd -0.01 -0.67 -0.02 -0.95 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 -0.65 
Maxim 0.01 0.77 -0.01 -1.10 -0.02 -1.60 0.01 0.41 
Seagate 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.33 
Marvell Tech 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -1.25 -0.01 -0.46 0.00 -0.29 
Analog 0.02 1.34 -0.02 -1.15 -0.01 -0.99 0.01 0.42 
CommScop -0.01 -0.42 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.30 
AMD 0.06 1.82 -0.04 -1.23 -0.02 -0.59 0.02 0.49 
Micron 0.02 0.91 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -0.91 -0.01 -0.58 
NVIDIA 0.02 0.68 -0.03 -0.86 -0.01 -0.19 0.00 -0.01 
Texas 0.01 0.81 -0.01 -0.78 -0.01 -0.71 0.00 0.22 
Western Dig -0.02 -0.73 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.70 -0.02 -0.85 
Intel 0.00 -0.14 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.33 
Microsoft -0.01 -1.46 0.00 0.33 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.12 
NASDAQ-100 0.00 0.49 -0.01 -2.00 -0.01 -1.31 0.00 -0.75 
 
AR(-5) t-value AR(-4) t-value AR(-3) t-value AR(-2) t-value 
Alphabet  0.00 -0.39 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.91 
Lumentum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.01 0.22 
Qorvo 0.04 2.41 -0.01 -0.54 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -0.73 
Finisar -0.01 -0.63 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.65 
II-VI -0.02 -0.65 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.75 
Skyworks 0.01 0.51 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.73 -0.03 -1.73 
Broadcom -0.01 -0.76 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.35 
QUALCOMM -0.01 -0.31 -0.01 -0.31 0.02 0.82 0.00 -0.02 
Flex Ltd -0.03 -1.97 -0.02 -1.12 0.00 0.27 -0.02 -1.20 
Maxim -0.01 -1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.31 -0.03 -2.40 
Seagate 0.01 0.70 -0.03 -1.40 0.00 -0.24 -0.03 -1.85 
Marvell Tech 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -1.07 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -1.51 
Analog -0.03 -1.89 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -1.96 
CommScop -0.01 -0.56 -0.20 -7.46 0.01 0.46 -0.01 -0.38 
AMD 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.42 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.42 
Micron -0.01 -0.36 0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.42 0.02 0.79 
NVIDIA 0.01 0.39 -0.01 -0.38 -0.01 -0.22 0.00 0.03 
Texas -0.01 -0.77 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.17 -0.01 -1.11 
Western Dig -0.01 -0.28 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.52 -0.02 -0.66 
Intel -0.02 -1.43 -0.05 -3.25 -0.01 -0.63 0.00 0.18 
Microsoft 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.48 0.01 1.39 0.01 1.01 
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NASDAQ-100 0.00 -0.46 0.00 -0.39 0.00 -0.32 -0.01 -0.98 
 
AR(-1) t-value AR(0) t-value AR(1) t-value AR(2) t-value AR(3) t-value 
Alphabet  -0.02 -2.21 0.03 2.52 0.00 0.19 0.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.45 
Lumentum 0.01 0.26 -0.03 -0.86 -0.14 -3.66 -0.06 -1.50 -0.01 -0.28 
Qorvo 0.01 0.73 -0.01 -0.47 -0.09 -5.62 -0.05 -3.27 -0.02 -1.56 
Finisar 0.00 0.12 -0.01 -0.64 -0.05 -2.53 -0.02 -0.88 0.01 0.31 
II-VI 0.03 1.11 -0.01 -0.24 -0.06 -2.22 -0.03 -1.17 0.03 1.18 
Skyworks 0.01 0.30 -0.01 -0.27 -0.07 -3.94 -0.04 -1.96 -0.01 -0.60 
Broadcom 0.02 0.94 -0.01 -0.30 -0.04 -2.07 -0.02 -1.07 -0.05 -2.99 
QUALCOMM 0.02 0.62 -0.01 -0.33 -0.05 -1.91 -0.01 -0.41 -0.05 -2.05 
Flex Ltd 0.03 1.83 0.01 0.52 -0.02 -1.15 -0.01 -0.79 -0.03 -2.07 
Maxim 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -1.40 -0.01 -0.42 0.00 -0.31 
Seagate 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.45 -0.01 -0.49 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.30 
Marvell Tech 0.02 1.17 -0.01 -0.36 -0.01 -0.80 -0.01 -0.72 -0.03 -1.62 
Analog 0.01 0.79 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -2.84 -0.03 -2.06 -0.02 -1.49 
CommScop 0.01 0.31 -0.01 -0.39 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.02 -0.68 
AMD 0.01 0.46 -0.02 -0.53 -0.01 -0.22 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.05 
Micron 0.01 0.57 -0.02 -0.95 -0.04 -2.08 -0.02 -0.77 -0.02 -0.75 
NVIDIA 0.01 0.17 -0.03 -1.08 -0.01 -0.35 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 
Texas 0.01 0.38 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -1.55 -0.01 -0.93 -0.01 -0.38 
Western Dig 0.02 0.91 0.00 0.16 -0.02 -0.88 0.00 0.19 -0.04 -1.68 
Intel 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.73 0.00 -0.23 -0.02 -0.99 
Microsoft 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.07 0.01 1.38 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.17 
NASDAQ-100 0.01 1.03 0.00 -0.27 -0.01 -1.51 -0.01 -0.98 -0.01 -2.41 
 
AR(4) t-value AR(5) t-value AR(6) t-value AR(7) t-value 
Alphabet  0.00 -0.23 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.77 -0.01 -0.76 
Lumentum 0.02 0.42 -0.01 -0.25 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.10 
Qorvo -0.01 -0.58 -0.02 -1.05 0.03 1.82 0.03 1.67 
Finisar 0.01 0.54 -0.02 -0.90 -0.01 -0.45 0.01 0.61 
II-VI 0.03 0.87 -0.03 -1.11 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.96 
Skyworks 0.01 0.67 -0.01 -0.62 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.77 
Broadcom 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 -1.23 -0.02 -1.32 -0.02 -1.17 
QUALCOMM 0.00 0.18 -0.11 -4.37 -0.01 -0.24 -0.03 -1.29 
Flex Ltd 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -1.37 -0.01 -0.86 -0.02 -1.49 
Maxim 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.86 0.01 1.00 -0.01 -0.91 
Seagate 0.02 1.06 -0.03 -1.46 0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.76 
Marvell Tech 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.72 -0.01 -0.40 -0.01 -0.78 
Analog 0.01 0.85 0.02 1.26 -0.01 -0.95 -0.01 -0.42 
CommScop 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.86 -0.01 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 
AMD 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 
Micron 0.01 0.58 -0.02 -0.84 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.20 
NVIDIA 0.01 0.17 -0.01 -0.26 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.47 
Texas 0.01 0.70 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.51 -0.01 -0.70 
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Western Dig 0.02 0.84 -0.02 -0.93 0.01 0.24 -0.01 -0.55 
Intel 0.01 0.64 -0.01 -0.37 0.03 1.81 0.00 0.00 
Microsoft -0.01 -0.90 0.01 1.28 0.01 0.68 0.00 -0.17 
NASDAQ-100 0.01 0.90 -0.01 -0.95 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.76 
 
AR(8) t-value AR(9) t-value AR(10) t-value 
Alphabet  0.00 0.46 -0.01 -0.70 0.00 -0.17 
Lumentum -0.03 -0.67 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.08 
Qorvo -0.02 -1.31 0.03 2.09 -0.01 -0.42 
Finisar 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.15 
II-VI 0.00 -0.13 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.14 
Skyworks -0.02 -0.91 0.02 0.95 -0.01 -0.37 
Broadcom 0.00 -0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.28 
QUALCOMM -0.01 -0.46 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.33 
Flex Ltd 0.00 -0.16 0.01 0.46 0.00 -0.05 
Maxim -0.02 -1.81 0.03 2.22 0.01 0.58 
Seagate -0.01 -0.47 0.03 1.88 0.00 0.07 
Marvell Tech -0.02 -1.55 0.04 2.35 0.00 0.16 
Analog -0.01 -0.80 0.02 1.11 0.00 0.06 
CommScop -0.04 -1.50 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.55 
AMD 0.10 3.29 -0.02 -0.54 -0.01 -0.29 
Micron -0.02 -1.16 0.02 1.16 0.00 -0.12 
NVIDIA 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.32 
Texas -0.01 -1.09 0.02 1.22 0.01 0.64 
Western Dig -0.03 -1.17 0.01 0.55 -0.01 -0.34 
Intel -0.02 -1.20 0.02 1.48 0.01 0.57 
Microsoft 0.00 0.38 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.32 
NASDAQ-100 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.32 
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Table : Average Abnormal Return results (Market Model) 
 
AAR(-
9) 
AAR(-
8) 
AAR(-
7) 
AAR(-
6) 
AAR(-
5) 
AAR(-
4) 
AAR(-
3) 
AAR(-
2) 
AAR(-
1) 
AAR(0
) 
AAR value 0.9% -0.9% -0.9% 0.1% -0.5% -1.5% 0.0% -1.0% 0.9% -0.6% 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 14:07 8:13 4:17 12:09 7:14 9:12 8:13 7:14 18:03 6:15 
Patell Z 1.51 -2.36 -1.85 0.24 -1.33 -3.11 0.06 -2.46 1.74 -0.63 
Gener Sign Z 1.60 -1.02 -2.76 0.73 -1.46 -0.58 -1.02 -1.46 3.35 -1.89 
Csect T 2.23 -2.13 -4.59 0.19 -1.28 -1.59 0.09 -2.79 3.55 -1.97 
StdCSect Z 1.82 -2.33 -3.85 0.44 -1.38 -1.80 0.12 -2.61 2.29 -0.87 
Rank Z 0.94 -0.76 -1.17 0.36 -0.72 -0.69 0.07 -1.09 1.25 -0.66 
Gener Rank 
T 0.94 -0.83 -1.86 0.31 -0.82 -0.61 -0.23 -1.18 1.42 -0.91 
Adj Patell Z 1.51 -2.36 -1.85 0.24 -1.33 -3.12 0.06 -2.46 1.75 -0.63 
Adj StdCSect 
Z 1.82 -2.33 -3.85 0.44 -1.38 -1.80 0.12 -2.61 2.29 -0.87 
Gen Rank Z 2.17 -1.91 -4.27 0.72 -1.89 -1.41 -0.52 -2.71 3.28 -2.11 
Skew Cor T 2.54 -2.20 -4.85 0.19 -1.17 -2.56 0.11 -2.75 3.16 -2.02 
 
AAR(1
) 
AAR(2
) 
AAR(3
) 
AAR(4
) 
AAR(5
) 
AAR(6
) 
AAR(7
) 
AAR(8
) 
AAR(9
) 
AAR(1
0) 
AAR values -3.3% -1.4% -1.4% 0.8% -1.3% 0.2% -0.4% -0.8% 1.1% 0.1% 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 3:18 5:16 5:16 15:06 7:14 10:11 6:15 3:18 15:06 12:09 
Patell Z -7.07 -3.25 -3.42 1.55 -2.24 0.67 -1.13 -2.29 3.15 0.36 
Gener Sign Z -3.20 -2.33 -2.33 2.04 -1.46 -0.15 -1.89 -3.20 2.04 0.73 
Csect T -4.25 -3.45 -3.07 3.70 -2.20 0.57 -1.17 -1.35 3.49 0.55 
StdCSect Z -4.51 -3.57 -3.49 2.96 -1.84 0.84 -1.45 -2.15 3.47 1.08 
Rank Z -2.18 -1.43 -1.40 1.14 -0.99 0.29 -0.64 -1.44 1.36 0.48 
Gener Rank 
T -1.92 -1.55 -1.44 1.43 -0.93 0.18 -0.79 -1.46 1.37 0.49 
Adj Patell Z -7.08 -3.25 -3.42 1.55 -2.24 0.67 -1.13 -2.29 3.15 0.36 
Adj StdCSect 
Z -4.51 -3.57 -3.49 2.96 -1.84 0.84 -1.45 -2.16 3.47 1.08 
Gen Rank Z -4.42 -3.57 -3.31 3.29 -2.16 0.42 -1.82 -3.35 3.16 1.14 
Skew Cor T -6.68 -4.39 -3.12 3.68 -3.29 0.59 -1.13 -0.84 3.57 0.58 
 
Table : Average Abnormal Return results (E-Garch Model) 
 
AAR(-
9) 
AAR(-
8) 
AAR(-
7) 
AAR(-
6) 
AAR(-
5) 
AAR(-
4) 
AAR(-
3) 
AAR(-
2) 
AAR(-
1) AAR(0) 
AAR values 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 14:07 7:14 3:18 14:07 7:14 8:13 9:12 7:14 17:04 6:15 
Patell Z 1.52 -2.42 -1.80 0.35 -1.30 -3.05 0.07 -2.27 1.70 -0.66 
Gener Sign Z 1.60 -1.46 -3.20 1.60 -1.46 -1.02 -0.58 -1.46 2.91 -1.89 
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Csect T 2.15 -2.27 -4.11 0.34 -1.31 -1.59 0.00 -2.56 3.33 -1.94 
StdCSect Z 1.81 -2.44 -3.66 0.65 -1.36 -1.77 0.14 -2.34 2.20 -0.90 
Rank Z 0.96 -0.83 -1.15 0.46 -0.73 -0.67 0.07 -0.83 1.21 -0.68 
Gener Rank 
T 0.94 -0.89 -1.81 0.51 -0.80 -0.62 -0.22 -0.89 1.35 -0.93 
Adj Patell Z 1.52 -2.42 -1.81 0.35 -1.30 -3.05 0.07 -2.27 1.70 -0.67 
Adj StdCSect 
Z 1.81 -2.44 -3.67 0.65 -1.36 -1.77 0.14 -2.34 2.20 -0.90 
Gen Rank Z 2.17 -2.06 -4.19 1.17 -1.86 -1.45 -0.50 -2.06 3.12 -2.15 
Skew Cor T 2.50 -2.32 -5.23 0.32 -1.18 -2.56 0.03 -2.62 3.01 -2.10 
 
AAR(1) AAR(2) AAR(3) AAR(4) AAR(5) AAR(6) AAR(7) AAR(8) AAR(9) 
AAR(10
) 
AAR values -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 2:19 5:16 5:16 15:06 7:14 10:11 6:15 4:17 15:06 12:09 
Patell Z -7.06 -3.16 -3.32 1.50 -2.19 0.77 -1.11 -2.24 3.19 0.35 
Gener Sign Z -3.64 -2.33 -2.33 2.04 -1.46 -0.15 -1.89 -2.76 2.04 0.73 
Csect T -4.24 -3.15 -3.04 3.41 -2.26 0.68 -1.25 -1.34 3.35 0.39 
StdCSect Z -4.54 -3.41 -3.40 2.78 -1.84 1.00 -1.45 -2.08 3.49 1.05 
Rank Z -2.21 -1.38 -1.41 1.07 -0.97 0.39 -0.61 -1.44 1.39 0.47 
Gener Rank 
T -1.94 -1.49 -1.44 1.30 -0.93 0.27 -0.78 -1.43 1.41 0.52 
Adj Patell Z -7.07 -3.16 -3.32 1.51 -2.19 0.77 -1.11 -2.24 3.20 0.36 
Adj StdCSect 
Z -4.55 -3.41 -3.41 2.78 -1.84 1.00 -1.45 -2.09 3.50 1.05 
Gen Rank Z -4.49 -3.45 -3.32 3.00 -2.16 0.62 -1.81 -3.31 3.26 1.19 
Skew Cor T -6.86 -4.22 -2.91 3.44 -3.33 0.71 -1.17 -0.86 3.37 0.38 
 
Table : Average Abnormal Return results (Fama French 3-Factor Model) 
 
AAR(-
9) 
AAR(-
8) 
AAR(-
7) 
AAR(-
6) 
AAR(-
5) 
AAR(-
4) 
AAR(-
3) 
AAR(-
2) 
AAR(-
1) 
AAR(0
) 
AAR values 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 14:07 8:13 4:17 13:08 8:13 4:17 7:14 6:15 17:04 5:16 
Patell Z 1.59 -2.18 -1.76 0.20 -1.55 -3.46 -0.14 -2.41 1.54 -0.52 
Gener Sign 
Z 1.68 -0.94 -2.69 1.24 -0.94 -2.69 -1.38 -1.82 2.99 -2.25 
Csect T 2.26 -1.87 -4.26 0.15 -1.48 -1.76 -0.24 -2.77 3.18 -2.02 
StdCSect Z 1.86 -2.12 -3.68 0.36 -1.56 -2.05 -0.26 -2.56 2.11 -0.78 
Rank Z 0.94 -0.62 -1.09 0.34 -0.74 -0.91 -0.08 -1.01 1.17 -0.60 
Gener Rank 
T 0.96 -0.65 -1.81 0.34 -0.80 -0.69 -0.44 -1.09 1.26 -0.83 
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Adj Patell Z 1.59 -2.18 -1.76 0.20 -1.55 -3.46 -0.14 -2.41 1.54 -0.52 
Adj StdCSe
ct Z 1.86 -2.12 -3.68 0.36 -1.56 -2.05 -0.26 -2.56 2.11 -0.78 
Gen Rank Z 2.21 -1.49 -4.17 0.78 -1.85 -1.61 -1.02 -2.52 2.92 -1.93 
Skew Cor T 2.62 -1.85 -5.04 0.13 -1.36 -2.95 -0.20 -2.69 3.20 -2.00 
 
AAR(
1) 
AAR(
2) 
AAR(
3) 
AAR(
4) 
AAR(
5) 
AAR(
6) 
AAR(
7) 
AAR(
8) 
AAR(
9) 
AAR(1
0) 
AAR values -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Pos:Neg 3:18 5:16 4:17 16:05 7:14 10:11 7:14 4:17 15:06 13:08 
Patell Z -7.22 -3.15 -3.37 1.52 -2.09 0.68 -1.16 -2.29 3.08 0.49 
Gener Sign 
Z -3.13 -2.25 -2.69 2.55 -1.38 -0.07 -1.38 -2.69 2.11 1.24 
Csect T -4.17 -3.12 -2.98 3.65 -2.10 0.56 -1.24 -1.36 3.46 0.91 
StdCSect Z -4.42 -3.42 -3.43 2.85 -1.70 0.83 -1.50 -2.17 3.44 1.43 
Rank Z -2.15 -1.34 -1.33 1.10 -0.90 0.29 -0.64 -1.40 1.39 0.59 
Gener Rank 
T -1.90 -1.45 -1.36 1.42 -0.86 0.18 -0.79 -1.41 1.36 0.70 
Adj Patell Z -7.22 -3.15 -3.37 1.52 -2.09 0.68 -1.16 -2.29 3.08 0.49 
Adj StdCSe
ct Z -4.42 -3.42 -3.43 2.85 -1.70 0.83 -1.50 -2.17 3.44 1.43 
Gen Rank Z -4.38 -3.34 -3.13 3.27 -1.99 0.41 -1.81 -3.26 3.14 1.61 
Skew Cor T -6.56 -4.13 -3.09 3.65 -3.11 0.58 -1.17 -0.85 3.59 0.89 
 
Table : CAR (-9,10) window (Market model) 
(-9, 10) 
CAR 
Value 
BHAR 
Value 
CAR t-
test 
Alphabet  0.02 0.02 0.45 
Lumentum -0.25 -0.20 -1.43 
Qorvo -0.12 -0.11 -1.71 
Finisar -0.09 -0.09 -1.12 
II-VI 0.01 0.01 0.11 
Skyworks -0.17 -0.15 -2.07 
Broadcom -0.21 -0.19 -2.79 
QUALCOMM -0.26 -0.24 -2.23 
Flex Ltd -0.19 -0.17 -2.61 
Maxim -0.06 -0.06 -1.09 
Seagate -0.02 -0.03 -0.30 
Marvell 
Tech 
-0.08 -0.08 -1.17 
Analog -0.13 -0.12 -1.97 
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CommScop -0.28 -0.25 -2.41 
AMD 0.17 0.15 1.20 
Micron -0.11 -0.09 -1.18 
NVIDIA -0.10 -0.08 -0.71 
Texas -0.04 -0.04 -0.75 
Western Dig -0.16 -0.14 -1.44 
Intel -0.06 -0.05 -0.80 
Microsoft 0.04 0.04 1.19 
 
Table : CAR (-3,3) window  
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(-3, 3) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
Alphabet  0.01 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.01 0.39 
Lumentum -0.23 -0.20 -2.26 -0.29 -0.26 -2.84 -0.25 -0.22 -2.42 
Qorvo -0.17 -0.15 -4.17 -0.17 -0.15 -4.14 -0.17 -0.16 -4.31 
Finisar -0.08 -0.08 -1.64 -0.07 -0.06 -1.31 -0.09 -0.08 -1.69 
II-VI -0.06 -0.06 -0.81 -0.06 -0.06 -0.79 -0.06 -0.06 -0.77 
Skyworks -0.17 -0.15 -3.38 -0.18 -0.17 -3.67 -0.17 -0.16 -3.46 
Broadcom -0.10 -0.10 -2.29 -0.10 -0.10 -2.28 -0.11 -0.10 -2.43 
QUALCOMM -0.09 -0.09 -1.24 -0.07 -0.07 -0.96 -0.08 -0.08 -1.22 
Flex Ltd -0.04 -0.04 -0.98 -0.04 -0.04 -0.93 -0.04 -0.04 -0.94 
Maxim -0.06 -0.06 -1.80 -0.06 -0.06 -1.86 -0.06 -0.06 -1.82 
Seagate -0.03 -0.03 -0.64 -0.01 -0.01 -0.26 -0.03 -0.03 -0.64 
Marvell Tech -0.06 -0.06 -1.41 -0.06 -0.06 -1.52 -0.06 -0.06 -1.44 
Analog -0.11 -0.11 -2.95 -0.10 -0.10 -2.68 -0.11 -0.11 -3.06 
CommScop 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
AMD 0.03 0.03 0.42 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.04 0.48 
Micron -0.08 -0.07 -1.37 -0.07 -0.06 -1.26 -0.08 -0.07 -1.35 
NVIDIA -0.05 -0.04 -0.60 -0.06 -0.05 -0.71 -0.05 -0.05 -0.64 
Texas -0.05 -0.05 -1.33 -0.04 -0.04 -1.23 -0.05 -0.05 -1.38 
Western Dig -0.06 -0.06 -0.94 -0.06 -0.06 -0.93 -0.06 -0.06 -0.87 
Intel -0.04 -0.04 -0.98 -0.04 -0.04 -1.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.92 
Microsoft 0.04 0.03 1.62 0.03 0.03 1.51 0.03 0.03 1.54 
 
Table : CAR (0,1) window 
 
Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(0,1) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
Alphabet 0.03 0.03 1.92 0.03 0.03 1.89 0.03 0.03 1.85 
Lumentum -0.18 -0.18 -3.20 -0.18 -0.18 -3.36 -0.17 -0.17 -3.13 
-50- 
Qorvo -0.09 -0.09 -4.31 -0.09 -0.09 -4.30 -0.09 -0.09 -4.31 
Finisar -0.06 -0.06 -2.24 -0.06 -0.06 -2.26 -0.06 -0.06 -2.19 
II-VI -0.07 -0.07 -1.74 -0.07 -0.07 -1.79 -0.07 -0.07 -1.78 
Skyworks -0.08 -0.08 -2.98 -0.08 -0.08 -2.96 -0.08 -0.08 -2.99 
Broadcom -0.04 -0.04 -1.68 -0.04 -0.04 -1.76 -0.04 -0.04 -1.64 
QUALCOM
M 
-0.06 -0.06 -1.58 -0.06 -0.06 -1.53 -0.06 -0.06 -1.59 
Flex Ltd -0.01 -0.01 -0.45 -0.01 -0.01 -0.47 -0.01 -0.01 -0.49 
Maxim -0.02 -0.02 -0.95 -0.02 -0.02 -0.96 -0.02 -0.02 -0.93 
Seagate 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
Marvell 
Tech 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.82 -0.02 -0.02 -0.88 -0.02 -0.02 -0.77 
Analog -0.04 -0.04 -2.09 -0.04 -0.04 -1.95 -0.04 -0.04 -2.14 
CommSco
p 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.26 -0.02 -0.02 -0.51 -0.01 -0.01 -0.31 
AMD -0.02 -0.02 -0.53 -0.02 -0.02 -0.41 -0.03 -0.03 -0.58 
Micron -0.06 -0.06 -2.14 -0.06 -0.06 -2.11 -0.07 -0.07 -2.20 
NVIDIA -0.04 -0.04 -1.01 -0.05 -0.05 -1.23 -0.04 -0.04 -0.96 
Texas -0.02 -0.02 -1.16 -0.02 -0.02 -1.05 -0.02 -0.02 -1.19 
Western 
Dig 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.51 -0.02 -0.02 -0.51 -0.02 -0.02 -0.58 
Intel -0.01 -0.01 -0.57 -0.02 -0.02 -0.69 -0.01 -0.01 -0.62 
Microsoft 0.01 0.01 1.03 0.01 0.01 1.03 0.01 0.01 1.11 
 
Table : CAR (0,2) window 
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(0,2) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
Alphabet  0.02 0.02 1.40 0.03 0.03 1.42 0.02 0.02 1.40 
Lumentum -0.23 -0.22 -3.48 -0.25 -0.24 -3.77 -0.24 -0.23 -3.58 
Qorvo -0.14 -0.14 -5.40 -0.14 -0.14 -5.40 -0.14 -0.14 -5.42 
Finisar -0.08 -0.08 -2.34 -0.07 -0.07 -2.24 -0.08 -0.08 -2.35 
II-VI -0.11 -0.10 -2.10 -0.11 -0.10 -2.13 -0.10 -0.10 -2.05 
Skyworks -0.12 -0.11 -3.56 -0.12 -0.12 -3.65 -0.11 -0.11 -3.54 
Broadcom -0.06 -0.06 -1.99 -0.06 -0.06 -2.04 -0.06 -0.06 -1.99 
QUALCOMM -0.07 -0.07 -1.53 -0.06 -0.06 -1.40 -0.07 -0.07 -1.55 
Flex Ltd -0.02 -0.02 -0.82 -0.02 -0.02 -0.82 -0.02 -0.02 -0.78 
Maxim -0.02 -0.02 -1.02 -0.02 -0.02 -1.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.99 
Seagate 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Marvell Tech -0.03 -0.03 -1.08 -0.03 -0.03 -1.15 -0.03 -0.03 -1.09 
-51- 
Analog -0.07 -0.07 -2.89 -0.07 -0.07 -2.72 -0.07 -0.07 -2.86 
CommScop 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.05 
AMD -0.02 -0.02 -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.02 -0.02 -0.34 
Micron -0.08 -0.08 -2.19 -0.08 -0.08 -2.14 -0.08 -0.08 -2.14 
NVIDIA -0.05 -0.04 -0.86 -0.05 -0.05 -1.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.88 
Texas -0.03 -0.03 -1.48 -0.03 -0.03 -1.39 -0.03 -0.03 -1.42 
Western Dig -0.01 -0.01 -0.31 -0.01 -0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 -0.27 
Intel -0.02 -0.02 -0.60 -0.02 -0.02 -0.69 -0.02 -0.02 -0.57 
Microsoft 0.02 0.02 1.15 0.02 0.02 1.12 0.02 0.02 1.08 
 
Table : CAR (0,3) window 
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(0,3) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
Alphabet  0.02 0.02 0.99 0.02 0.02 1.05 0.02 0.02 0.91 
Lumentum -0.25 -0.22 -3.15 -0.28 -0.26 -3.55 -0.24 -0.22 -3.14 
Qorvo -0.17 -0.16 -5.46 -0.17 -0.16 -5.45 -0.16 -0.15 -5.42 
Finisar -0.07 -0.07 -1.87 -0.06 -0.06 -1.68 -0.07 -0.07 -1.83 
II-VI -0.07 -0.07 -1.23 -0.07 -0.07 -1.23 -0.07 -0.07 -1.21 
Skyworks -0.13 -0.12 -3.39 -0.13 -0.13 -3.56 -0.12 -0.12 -3.34 
Broadcom -0.11 -0.11 -3.22 -0.11 -0.11 -3.24 -0.10 -0.10 -3.16 
QUALCOMM -0.12 -0.12 -2.35 -0.11 -0.11 -2.17 -0.13 -0.12 -2.39 
Flex Ltd -0.06 -0.06 -1.75 -0.06 -0.06 -1.72 -0.06 -0.06 -1.74 
Maxim -0.03 -0.03 -1.04 -0.03 -0.03 -1.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.99 
Seagate 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.19 
Marvell Tech -0.06 -0.06 -1.75 -0.06 -0.06 -1.83 -0.06 -0.06 -1.72 
Analog -0.09 -0.09 -3.25 -0.09 -0.09 -3.05 -0.09 -0.09 -3.20 
CommScop -0.01 -0.02 -0.28 -0.02 -0.02 -0.43 -0.02 -0.02 -0.34 
AMD -0.02 -0.02 -0.28 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 -0.02 -0.02 -0.32 
Micron -0.10 -0.09 -2.28 -0.09 -0.09 -2.21 -0.09 -0.09 -2.25 
NVIDIA -0.05 -0.05 -0.78 -0.06 -0.05 -0.91 -0.05 -0.04 -0.76 
Texas -0.04 -0.04 -1.47 -0.04 -0.04 -1.39 -0.04 -0.04 -1.40 
Western Dig -0.05 -0.05 -1.11 -0.05 -0.05 -1.10 -0.06 -0.06 -1.13 
Intel -0.03 -0.03 -1.02 -0.03 -0.03 -1.07 -0.03 -0.03 -1.04 
Microsoft 0.02 0.02 1.08 0.02 0.02 1.02 0.02 0.02 1.09 
 
Table : CAR (0,5) window 
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(0,5) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
-52- 
Alphabet  0.02 0.02 0.96 0.03 0.03 1.03 0.02 0.02 0.91 
Lumentum -0.24 -0.22 -2.50 -0.28 -0.27 -2.97 -0.24 -0.22 -2.53 
Qorvo -0.19 -0.18 -5.12 -0.19 -0.18 -5.10 -0.19 -0.18 -5.08 
Finisar -0.08 -0.08 -1.67 -0.07 -0.07 -1.47 -0.08 -0.08 -1.66 
II-VI -0.08 -0.08 -1.10 -0.08 -0.08 -1.11 -0.08 -0.08 -1.06 
Skyworks -0.13 -0.12 -2.75 -0.13 -0.13 -2.93 -0.12 -0.12 -2.67 
Broadcom -0.13 -0.13 -3.19 -0.13 -0.13 -3.23 -0.13 -0.12 -3.14 
QUALCOMM -0.23 -0.22 -3.63 -0.22 -0.20 -3.42 -0.23 -0.22 -3.66 
Flex Ltd -0.08 -0.08 -2.01 -0.08 -0.08 -1.99 -0.08 -0.08 -1.98 
Maxim -0.01 -0.01 -0.24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 
Seagate 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marvell Tech -0.03 -0.03 -0.73 -0.03 -0.03 -0.82 -0.03 -0.03 -0.72 
Analog -0.06 -0.06 -1.79 -0.05 -0.06 -1.55 -0.06 -0.06 -1.69 
CommScop -0.04 -0.04 -0.59 -0.05 -0.05 -0.79 -0.04 -0.04 -0.63 
AMD -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 
Micron -0.10 -0.10 -1.96 -0.10 -0.09 -1.88 -0.10 -0.09 -1.90 
NVIDIA -0.05 -0.05 -0.68 -0.06 -0.06 -0.86 -0.05 -0.05 -0.68 
Texas -0.03 -0.03 -0.87 -0.02 -0.02 -0.75 -0.02 -0.02 -0.75 
Western Dig -0.06 -0.06 -0.94 -0.06 -0.06 -0.93 -0.06 -0.06 -0.93 
Intel -0.03 -0.03 -0.72 -0.03 -0.03 -0.81 -0.03 -0.03 -0.72 
Microsoft 0.02 0.02 1.04 0.02 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.02 1.00 
 
Table : CAR (0,10) window 
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
(0,10) CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
Alphabet  0.02 0.02 0.59 0.02 0.02 0.72 0.02 0.02 0.56 
Lumentum -0.26 -0.23 -2.01 -0.35 -0.31 -2.70 -0.26 -0.23 -2.05 
Qorvo -0.13 -0.13 -2.62 -0.13 -0.12 -2.56 -0.13 -0.12 -2.58 
Finisar -0.08 -0.08 -1.22 -0.06 -0.05 -0.88 -0.08 -0.08 -1.22 
II-VI -0.04 -0.04 -0.45 -0.04 -0.04 -0.44 -0.04 -0.04 -0.40 
Skyworks -0.10 -0.10 -1.60 -0.12 -0.11 -1.92 -0.09 -0.09 -1.54 
Broadcom -0.17 -0.16 -3.04 -0.17 -0.16 -3.06 -0.17 -0.16 -3.02 
QUALCOMM -0.27 -0.24 -3.07 -0.24 -0.21 -2.74 -0.27 -0.25 -3.10 
Flex Ltd -0.11 -0.11 -2.12 -0.11 -0.11 -2.06 -0.11 -0.11 -2.08 
Maxim 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.18 
Seagate 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.61 0.01 0.01 0.16 
Marvell Tech -0.03 -0.03 -0.60 -0.04 -0.04 -0.73 -0.03 -0.03 -0.60 
Analog -0.08 -0.08 -1.63 -0.06 -0.06 -1.29 -0.07 -0.07 -1.54 
CommScop -0.07 -0.06 -0.76 -0.08 -0.08 -0.97 -0.07 -0.07 -0.78 
-53- 
AMD 0.07 0.06 0.64 0.08 0.07 0.77 0.07 0.06 0.64 
Micron -0.10 -0.09 -1.42 -0.09 -0.08 -1.30 -0.09 -0.09 -1.36 
NVIDIA -0.08 -0.07 -0.83 -0.10 -0.09 -1.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.83 
Texas -0.02 -0.02 -0.46 -0.01 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -0.02 -0.36 
Western Dig -0.09 -0.08 -1.08 -0.09 -0.08 -1.07 -0.09 -0.08 -1.06 
Intel 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.27 
Microsoft 0.03 0.03 1.08 0.03 0.03 0.96 0.03 0.03 1.03 
 
Table : CAR of Nasdaq 100 technology index 
  Market Model E-Garch model Fama French 3-Factor model 
NASDAQ-100 CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test CAR BHAR t-test 
(-9, 10) -0.06 -0.06 -2.31 -0.05 -0.05 -2.01 -0.06 -0.06 -2.39 
(-3, 3) -0.03 -0.03 -2.06 -0.03 -0.03 -1.88 -0.03 -0.03 -2.11 
(-3, 0) 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.36 
(0, 1) -0.01 -0.01 -1.26 -0.01 -0.01 -1.10 -0.01 -0.01 -1.21 
(0, 2) -0.02 -0.02 -1.60 -0.01 -0.01 -1.44 -0.02 -0.02 -1.55 
(0, 3) -0.03 -0.03 -2.58 -0.03 -0.03 -2.43 -0.03 -0.03 -2.49 
(0, 5) -0.03 -0.03 -2.13 -0.03 -0.03 -1.94 -0.03 -0.03 -2.04 
(0, 10) -0.03 -0.03 -1.70 -0.03 -0.03 -1.47 -0.03 -0.03 -1.64 
 
Table : CAAR Market model 
CAAR Type (-9, 10) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
CAAR Value -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Weighted CAAR -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
ABHAR -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Pos:Neg 4:17 3:18 5:16 2:19 4:17 3:18 2:19 6:15 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Patell Z -4.89 -5.68 -3.44 -5.45 -6.32 -7.19 -6.15 -4.31 
Csect T -4.14 -4.70 -3.28 -4.07 -4.01 -4.79 -4.38 -3.71 
GenerSign Z -2.76 -3.20 -2.33 -3.64 -2.76 -3.20 -3.64 -1.89 
StdCSect Z -4.38 -4.41 -3.45 -3.94 -3.98 -4.65 -4.15 -3.64 
Rank Z -1.63 -2.07 -0.96 -2.04 -2.49 -2.82 -2.25 -1.67 
Gener Rank T -1.94 -1.99 -1.50 -1.78 -1.71 -1.98 -1.84 -1.51 
Adj Patell Z -2.30 -2.68 -1.62 -2.57 -2.98 -3.39 -2.90 -2.03 
Adj StdCSect Z -1.49 -1.36 -1.18 -1.14 -1.26 -1.51 -1.34 -1.16 
Gener Rank T -4.47 -4.57 -3.47 -4.11 -3.95 -4.55 -4.24 -3.48 
Skewness Corr T -3.65 -6.06 -5.00 -6.15 -5.96 -6.88 -5.96 -4.58 
ABHAR Csect T -4.19 -4.88 -3.31 -4.09 -4.08 -4.92 -4.50 -3.82 
-54- 
ABHAR  CorrT -3.54 -5.85 -5.07 -6.13 -5.93 -6.77 -5.99 -4.57 
 
Table : CAAR E-Garch model 
CAAR Type (-3, 3) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
CAAR Value -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Weighted CAAR -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
ABHAR -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Pos:Neg 3:18 3:18 3:18 3:18 4:17 6:15 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Patell Z -5.56 -5.46 -6.29 -7.10 -6.08 -4.20 
Csect T -4.13 -4.02 -3.87 -4.50 -4.17 -3.35 
GenerSign Z -3.20 -3.20 -3.20 -3.20 -2.76 -1.89 
StdCSect Z -4.22 -3.98 -3.96 -4.56 -4.09 -3.47 
Rank Z -1.99 -2.06 -2.48 -2.82 -2.26 -1.63 
Gener Rank T -1.88 -1.81 -1.71 -1.96 -1.77 -1.48 
Adj Patell Z -2.62 -2.58 -2.96 -3.35 -2.87 -1.98 
Adj StdCSect Z -1.34 -1.15 -1.26 -1.49 -1.32 -1.12 
Gener Rank T -4.35 -4.18 -3.96 -4.54 -4.10 -3.42 
Skewness Corr T -6.21 -6.25 -6.03 -6.97 -5.83 -4.38 
ABHAR Csect T -4.27 -4.04 -3.94 -4.61 -4.27 -3.44 
ABHAR  CorrT -6.19 -6.24 -6.03 -6.93 -5.89 -4.39 
 
Table : CAAR Fama French 3-factor model 
CAAR Type (-3, 3) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (0, 5) (0, 10) 
CAAR Value -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Weighted CAAR -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
ABHAR -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Pos:Neg 3:18 2:19 4:17 3:18 3:18 6:15 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Patell Z -5.77 -5.48 -6.29 -7.13 -6.06 -4.23 
Csect T -4.53 -4.18 -3.96 -4.84 -4.34 -3.64 
GenerSign Z -3.13 -3.56 -2.69 -3.13 -3.13 -1.82 
StdCSect Z -4.32 -3.98 -3.95 -4.68 -4.13 -3.60 
Rank Z -2.03 -1.97 -2.37 -2.69 -2.12 -1.52 
Gener Rank T -1.91 -1.81 -1.73 -2.00 -1.80 -1.51 
Adj Patell Z -2.70 -2.57 -2.95 -3.34 -2.84 -1.98 
Adj StdCSect Z -1.35 -1.13 -1.24 -1.50 -1.33 -1.15 
Gener Rank T -4.40 -4.17 -3.98 -4.61 -4.14 -3.49 
-55- 
Skewness Corr T -5.94 -6.21 -5.97 -6.97 -5.99 -4.55 
ABHAR Csect T -4.70 -4.20 -4.03 -4.98 -4.46 -3.74 
ABHAR  CorrT -5.77 -6.20 -5.95 -6.87 -6.05 -4.55 
 
